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1. INTRODUCTION
Morten Balling, Jan Marc Berk & Marc-Olivier Strauss-Kahn 
On September 3-4, 2009 SUERF and Utrecht University School of Economics
organized the Colloquium The Quest for Stability in Utrecht the Netherlands.
The papers included in this SUERF Study are based on contributions to the Col-
loquium.
Chapter 2, “Uncertainty and risk management after the Great Moderation: The
role of (mis)management by financial institutions”, is written by Hans J. Blom-
mestein, OECD and Tilburg University, Lex H. Hoogduin, De Nederlandsche
Bank and University of Amsterdam and Jolanda Peeters, De Nederlandsche Bank.
The authors take a closer look at the inadequate risk management systems in
financial institutions. The rapid pace of financial innovation driven by ICT, devel-
opments in academic finance theory and a favourable regulatory environment
have presented major risk management challenges for banks and other financial
institutions. The risk management discipline developed into a kind of pseudo
quantitative science with pretensions far beyond its real risk management capa-
bilities. The authors mention the lack of understanding of the links between
incentives across all management levels and risk-taking as perhaps the clearest
example of the incompetency of risk management. There was too much reliance
on the quantitative side of risk management.
Chapter 3, “Banking in times of crisis: the case of Rabobank” is based on the
contribution by Wim W. Boonstra, Chief Economist, Rabobank. The author
gives an overview of Rabobank’s history, structure, cooperative governance and
strategy. Due to a conservative credit policy and a strong solvency ratio,
Rabobank has shown a much better performance during the financial crisis than
its big Dutch competitors. It remained comfortably profitable, its capital ratios
stayed intact by a wide margin and its domestic market shares increased substan-
tially. The bank’s business model is basically sound. The model is relatively crisis
proof. During the crisis, cooperative banks and savings banks appeared to be
more stable than shareholder driven commercial banks. Surprisingly, policy mak-
ers completely fail to understand that banks like Rabobank are based on a fun-
damentally different business model. What really matters is company culture.
Cultures are not created, they grow over the decades.
In Chapter 4, “Monitoring banking sector risks: An applied approach”, Veronica
Vallés and Christian Weistroffer, Deutsche Bank, present an early-warning model
that provides timely and readily digestible information on macroeconomic devel-
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opments. For industrial countries they combine measures of housing and equity
prices, domestic credit to GDP and economic output. For emerging markets they
base their model on domestic credit to GDP, the real effective exchange rate and
equity prices. The number of input variables is low, but the overall performance
of the model is robust and it may serve as a useful screening tool across a large
number of countries. The model is designed in such a way that it should meet the
professional needs of an internationally operating financial institution.
In Chapter  5, “Asset Price Fluctuations, Financial Crises and the Stabilizing
Effects of a General Transaction Tax”, Stephan Schulmeister, Senior Research
Fellow, WIFO compares what he calls mainstream economic theory concerning
asset price movements with a “bull-bear-hypothesis” which relies on technical
analysis of trends in asset prices. According to the author, fluctuations in asset
prices remain unexplained in mainstream economics while technical analysts can
derive useful buy and sell signals from the observed market movements. For illus-
tration, he presents socalled exchange rate runs and their duration and discusses
observed volatility patterns. A small financial transaction tax would, in the view
of the author, dampen the fluctuations of exchange rates, stock prices and com-
modity prices and help to prevent crises in the future.
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2. UNCERTAINTY AND RISK MANAGEMENT AFTER 
THE GREAT MODERATION1: THE ROLE OF RISK 
(MIS)MANAGEMENT BY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Hans J. Blommestein, Lex H. Hoogduin & Jolanda J.W. Peeters
Abstract
Since the early eighties volatility of GDP and inflation has been declining steadily
in many countries. Financial innovation has been identified as one of the key
factors driving this “Great Moderation”. Financial innovation was considered to
have improved significantly the allocation and sharing of financial risks, both
from a macro and micro perspective. In particular, the prevailing opinion was that
great progress has been made in developing models and other quantitative meth-
ods for measuring and managing risk. However, the global financial crisis that
started in the summer of 2007 revealed important failures in risk management by
financial institutions.
Over-optimism prevailed and risks were underpriced, caused by problems of both
a conceptual and technical nature. This paper analyses these two angles from the
viewpoint of financial institutions. Conceptually, we will show that risk manage-
ment degenerated into a “pseudo” quantitative science. This in turn gave a false
sense of security to financial institutions and their supervisors. Prior to the crisis,
supervisory and regulatory regimes assumed that for the financial sector as a
whole, risk management had been improved and that, as a result, financial stabil-
ity was enhanced. The fact that many financial activities were carried out in a
rapidly changing landscape – i.e. key decisions had to be taken in situations with
uncertainty – was largely ignored. At a very fundamental level it was mistakenly
assumed that all uncertainty can be measured in a reliable fashion using a proba-
bility distribution – i.e. all uncertainty can be treated as “risk”.
This attitude had also adverse consequences for the way risk management and
decision making were organised in financial institutions. There was too much
focus on quantitative models and measurement and too little on the qualitative
dimension of risk management, involving such issues as information flows,
people and their motives and incentives. In addition, even from a narrow, tech-
nical perspective risk management techniques proved to be insufficiently sophis-
ticated.
The second part of the paper focuses on the lessons to be learned from the past
episode of inadequate risk management at the level of financial institutions. Apart
from technical improvements there is a need for a greater emphasis on handling
fundamental uncertainty. More specifically, it will be shown that qualitative risk
1 The views expressed are personal ones and do not represent the organisations with which the authors are
affiliated.
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management is particularly important to deal with the latter uncertainty. How-
ever, even with better risk management the future remains uncertain and human
nature will remain largely unchanged. Finding better ways of dealing with funda-
mental uncertainty remains therefore a continuous challenge.
2.1. INTRODUCTION
For many years prior to the ongoing financial crisis, many advanced and devel-
oping countries had experienced a substantial decline in macroeconomic volatil-
ity. In the literature, a whole range of explanations has been put forward to
explain this “Great Moderation”2. These explanations can be classified under
three headings: improved performance of macro-economic policies, good luck
and structural changes. This paper emphasizes the role of the third explanation,
and in particular the role of financial innovation at the level of financial institu-
tions. At this micro level it was widely believed that significant improvements in
risk management in the financial sector had been effectively implemented, in par-
ticular by the use of credit risk transfer instruments and the widespread securiti-
zation of assets3. As a result, it was widely assumed by market participants and
regulators alike that, for the system as a whole, the allocation and sharing of
financial risks had been improved substantially.
However, with the financial crisis that started in the summer of 2007, the Great
Moderation turned into the Great Crash. The rosy view that better risk manage-
ment, new financial products and more complete markets had been key drivers
for increased macroeconomic stability, turned out to be a serious miscalculation.
With the unfolding of the financial crisis, it became clear that during the Great
Moderation excess optimism prevailed and risks in financial markets were to an
important degree seriously underpriced or simply ignored. Although the latest
wave of financial innovation expanded greatly the opportunities for risk sharing
and resulted in far more sophisticated risk management systems, it also led to an
increasingly complex financial landscape. In this new environment, risk manag-
ers relied too much on risk management models and quantitative techniques that,
although more technically sophisticated than in the past, were not capable to
deal with the complexities and hidden vulnerabilities of the new financial land-
scape.
In this paper, we take a closer look at the role of risk (mis)management by finan-
cial institutions in the demise of the Great Moderation and the emergence of the
global financial crisis. Note that we explicitly take a partial view by focussing pre-
dominantly on the micro level of risk management, i.e. at the level of financial
2 The term “Great Moderation” was first introduced by James Stock and Mark Watson, in a paper presented at
Jackson Hole in 2003. BERNANKE (2004) gave the phrase a wide audience.
3 BLOMMESTEIN (2006a).
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institutions. In other words, we will not provide a full-fledged or comprehensive
analysis of the causes of the financial crisis4. However, in doing so, we do not
exclude the importance of the role of other factors in the origin of the financial
crisis. On the contrary, we believe that mistaken macroeconomic policies as well
as deficiencies in the official oversight of the financial system were also major
factors in the global financial crisis, especially in light of global imbalances and
the emergence of systemic risks and network externalities during the evolution of
the crisis.
This paper is structured along the following lines. Section 2.2. analyses the role
of the risk management discipline in the Great Moderation. Section 2.3. shows
which failures in risk management were brought to light by the financial crisis. It
will be argued that the inadequacies in risk management prior to the crisis were
both of a conceptual and technical nature. Moreover, it will be shown that the
risk management framework was constructed as too narrow, because too little
attention was paid to qualitative aspects such as information flows, people and
their motives and incentives. Section 2.4. focuses on lessons from the past episode
of inadequate risk management at both a technical and conceptual level. Sec-
tion 2.5. concludes.
2.2. THE GREAT MODERATION AND THE ROLE OF RISK 
MANAGEMENT
One of the most striking features of the economic landscape over the approxi-
mately 25 years prior to the ongoing financial crisis has been the substantial
decline in macroeconomic volatility in many economies (see figure 1). Both indus-
trial and emerging market countries had entered a relatively long phase of low
and stable inflation5. At the same time, large parts of the world have experienced
lower output volatility. This remarkable decline in both inflation and GDP vola-
tility has come to be known as “The Great Moderation” (Bernanke, 2004). The
last years prior to the crisis, the Great Moderation was accompanied by strongly
performing financial markets with rising asset prices and, in particular in the
period 2004-2006, exceptional low volatilities and risk premia.
4 The literature on the causes of the financial crisis is very fast-growing (see e.g. FSA (2009); SENIOR SUPERVISORS
GROUP (2008); BIS (2009); among many others) and reveals failures on many levels and in varied domains. It
is beyond the scope of this paper to address all causes of the financial crisis. However, it is important to note
that other authors do emphasise other factors than discussed in this paper.
5 IHRIG et al. (2006) and MELICK and GALATI (2005) survey empirical work that documents this trend.
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Figure 1: the Great Moderation
In the literature, three types of explanations have been suggested for the Great
Moderation. The first class of explanations focuses on the improved performance
of macro-economic policies, in particular monetary policy (see e.g. Clarida et al.,
2000). The increased emphasis of central banks on price stability, accompanied
by a greater degree of independence and transparency, contributed to the long-
term steady performance of economies. The second class of explanations suggests
that the Great Moderation occurred because the shocks hitting the economy
became smaller and less frequent (Ahmed et al., 2002; Blanchard and Simon,
2001; Stock and Watson, 2003; Arias et al., 2006). According to this view, the
reduction in macroeconomic volatility was largely the result of “good luck”. The
final class of explanations focuses on the changes in the structure of economies
which have improved the ability of economies to absorb shocks. These structural
changes can have various sources. Kahn et al. (2002), for instance, have argued
that improvements in inventory management, based on advances in ICT, have
reduced the amplitude of fluctuations in inventory stocks, whereas others
attribute the Great Moderation at least partly to the increased openness to trade
and international capital flows and the related greater flexibility in labour and
product markets.
In this paper, we focus on the role of structural changes in financial markets as a
possible explanation of the Great Moderation (as well as of its demise, see Sec-
tion 3). In short, the underlying idea of this explanation is that innovations in
financial markets improved the allocation, sharing, and management of financial
risks. This resulted in lower volatility of financial markets, while also contribut-







75 80 85 90 95 00 05
United States Japan euro area











75 80 85 90 95 00 05
United States Japan euro area
Volatility in inflation
Percentage
SUERF2010_3.book  Page 10  Thursday, June 17, 2010  12:09 PMUNCERTAINTY AND RISK MANAGEMENT AFTER THE GREAT MODERATION 11
larcier
to keep credit and liquidity available during periods of financial stress6.
Over the past decades the financial landscape has changed in myriad ways. One
of the most revolutionary and dynamic factors driving financial markets concern
the rapid pace of financial innovations. In broad terms, financial innovation
refers to both technological advances which facilitate access to information, trad-
ing and means of payment, and to the emergence of new financial instruments
and services, new forms of organisation (risk control methodologies and systems
included) and more developed and complete financial markets. Financial innova-
tion has great potential benefits, as the increasing sophistication and depth of
financial markets have the potential to improve the efficiency of financial markets
by allocating capital where it can be most productive, while the broader disper-
sion of risk across the financial system might in principle allow firms and house-
holds to hedge a (greater) variety of risks more cheaply and/or effectively. Since
the 1980s, innovative financial engineering, propelled by financial liberalisation
and the widespread availability of information and communication technology,
has indeed led to a much richer spectrum of new financial instruments and to a
lowering of transaction costs and reduced information and agency costs (Merton,
1998). For instance, technological advances have made it possible to convert rel-
atively illiquid or non-tradable assets into newly created tradable securities. In
addition, new techniques have enhanced the ability to develop and estimate
sophisticated relative pricing models for a wide array of financial products.
Examples include the adjustable-rate mortgage, the bundling of sub prime mort-
gages into mortgage-backed securities or collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)
and credit default swaps (CDSs). In particularly the latest wave of financial inno-
vations has expanded greatly the opportunities for unbundling, sharing and
transferring financial risk, resulting in more complete financial markets. Impor-
tant ingredients contributing to the wider distribution and better allocation of
risk have been the increasing use of credit risk transfer instruments and the wide-
spread securitization of assets. While simple forms of securitized credit (e.g. cor-
porate bonds) have existed for almost as long as modern banking, the financial
system experienced an explosive growth in creating and processing securitized
credit since the mid-1990s (FSA, 2009). For example, many commercial banks
used collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) to distribute large shares of syndi-
cated loans. In this way, commercial banks were able to sell entire loans rather
than retain them on their balance sheet. More generally, in the latest wave of
financial innovations, banks began to securitisize a wide range of credit expo-
sures, while selling them (off-balance-sheet) to structured entities. These develop-
6 Empirical evidence for the proposition that financial innovation has resulted in a reduction in macroeconomic
volatility is provided by DYNAN et al. (2005). Their results suggest that financial innovation should be added
to the list of likely contributors to the mid-1980s stabilisation. However, according to some analysts (e.g. BORIO
et al. (2003)) greater macro-stability comes at the expense of greater occurrence of financial shocks.
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ments in financial innovations have resulted into a largely Latin alphabet soup of
new financial products and a Greek alphabet of risk measures.
The rapid pace of financial innovations (driven by ICT, developments in academic
finance theory and a favourable regulatory environment) presented major risk
management challenges for banks and other financial institutions. In an environ-
ment with a constant flux of financial innovations, resulting in the availability of
a wide range of new financial products, the field of risk management also devel-
oped rapidly.
However, financial innovation had two opposing effects on the risk management
discipline. On the one hand, the process of financial innovation has made the
management of risk easier; risks could be more easily sliced and diced, removed
from the balance sheet of financial institutions and hedged using derivatives (Ber-
nanke, 2007). In other words, risk management innovations were to an impor-
tant degree driven by product innovations. Some simplifications in risk manage-
ment practices resulted from breakthroughs in academic finance7, while other
innovations originated from within the industry itself; notably VaR had a revolu-
tionary impact on the process of risk management8. On the other hand, new
instruments and trading strategies made risk measurement and management
more complex and challenging (Schmidt Bies, 2004). A prominent example is the
valuation and pricing of structured products9. These new products are often
traded in markets that lack liquidity, resulting in very volatile pricing informa-
tion. Worse, in many cases historical data is not available and investors have to
rely on simulations with relatively arbitrary assumptions about correlations
between risks and default probabilities (Colander et al., 2008).
Notwithstanding these difficulties, financial innovation resulted in sophisticated
risk management models involving new quantitative techniques for measuring
risk. In fact, the risk management discipline developed itself into a kind of pseudo
quantitative science, with pretensions beyond its real risk management capabili-
ties. The development of risk management towards an increasingly quantitative
science also had consequences for the way in which financial institutions were
managed (i.e., the impact on their underlying corporate governance structure).
For example, the essence of enterprise-wide risk management is the strategic man-
7 The most prominent example of an academic breakthrough that resulted in a “simplification” of the risk
management practice is the development of Black and Scholes option pricing that eventually could even be
implemented in a user-friendly way on pocket calculators (COLANDER et al. (2008)). The Black Scholes option
pricing equation could also be used to construct hedges against various risks. Option pricing theory was prob-
ably the most important milestone in academic developments in the area of quantifying and managing financial
risk. This innovation was followed by the rapid adoption in the 1990s of the Heath-Jarrow-Morton framework
for the analysis of fixed-income securities and their various derivatives. Also this academic innovation could be
used fairly easily by traders for pricing purposes and calculating hedges thereby becoming rapidly an industry
standard.
8 The best known of these industry “Value at Risk” systems is the Risk Metrics system developed and published
by JP Morgan in the mid-1990s.
9 TURNBULL (2009) discusses the difficult challenges of measuring and managing risk of new financial products.
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agement of overall institutional risk across all risk categories and business units.
In many cases, however, risk management was to an increasingly extent treated
as a separate discipline within an institution, in which the main responsibility was
actually outsourced to a chief risk manager. Such a chief risk manager was often
kept “in splendid isolation” from top management and board of directors. As a
result, strategic risk management decisions were in fact not an essential part of
the design and implementation of the company’s overall business strategy
(OECD, 2009).
The latest wave of financial innovations expanded greatly the opportunities for
unbundling, sharing and transferring financial risk and resulted in far more
sophisticated risk management systems and tools. Nonetheless, the financial
instruments-cum-risk management revolution resulted de facto in a situation that
can be referred to as a “risk paradox” (Blommestein, 2008b).
On the one hand, the rapid growth in the widespread use of financial innovations
resulted in a revolutionary new financial landscape, in which financial engineer-
ing, the use of market value structures such as CDOs and CDSs, the integration
of products and services from outside suppliers, institutional investors, “carry
trade” and “endogenous liquidity” played greater roles than ever before. It was
widely believed that this new global financial landscape enabled – in principle –
an ever-wider range of financial and non-financial companies to manage risks
more effectively. This more efficient allocation of risk, driven by the incentive to
equalise risk-adjusted rates of return on investments globally, led in principle to
an increase in the creation of value and standards of living.
On the other hand, the continuous process of financial innovation also had an
important drawback. It resulted into an increasingly complex and incomprehen-
sible financial landscape in which a complex chain of multiple relationships
between multiple institutions and markets emerged (Blommestein, 2008a). Many
financial innovations had the effect of creating links between formerly uncon-
nected players and markets, which increased enormously the degree of connectiv-
ity and network externalities of the financial system. The growing importance of
derivatives for risk management and the leveraging of investment positions was
for example a driving force behind the stronger and more complex links between
cash and derivatives markets. Note that in this derivatives-connected, complex
financial landscape, it were not just commercial banks that played a major role,
but also hedge funds and investment banks and other financial institutions such
as private equity firms and insurance companies. For example, supervisors dis-
covered after the (near) demise of the hedge fund LTCM (in 1998), the investment
bank Bear Stearns (in 2008) and the insurance firm AIG (in 2008) that these
players were at the centre of complex webs of trades with other players in the
financial landscape that were very difficult to unravel.
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The higher degree of connectivity which characterised this new financial land-
scape had two major implications. First, as is well known from network theory,
a more highly connected system could be more vulnerable to shocks and systemic
failure (Colander et al., 2008; Haldane, 2009). However, this insight from net-
work theory was largely ignored prior to the financial crisis10, and the introduc-
tion of new derivates was considered as leading pre-dominantly to lead to higher
efficiency and better risk sharing. In reality, the risk level in this complex, liberal-
ised financial landscape was inherently and systematically higher than before.
The underlying network externalities and unsustainable leverage were largely
neglected by market participants (Blommestein, 2000a; Trichet, 2008).
Second, this increasingly interconnected financial system made it harder to price
risks correctly, while both market participants and supervisors underestimated
the increase in systemic risk. While risk managers had more rigorous risk man-
agement tools at their disposal, the changing financial landscape (characterised
by more complex products and markets, a higher level of systemic risk and
increased financial fragility) weakened the applicability and conditions under
which these quantitative tools and techniques can be used effectively. It turned
out that even sophisticated market participants had difficulties in understanding
the nature and pricing of new products and markets, due to the sheer complexity
of many new financial instruments and the underlying links in the new financial
landscape. Also securitisation was adversely affected by problems with incentives
and information as well as the pricing of tail events (Cechetti, 2009). More gen-
erally, a number of widely held assumptions proved to be costly wrong, in partic-
ular that the originate-and-distribute model would decrease residual risk on the
balance sheet of banks, that the growing use of credit risk transfer instruments
would result in better allocated and managed risks and a more stable banking
sector and that ample liquidity would always be available.
2.3. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE EMERGENCE OF 
FAILURES IN RISK MANAGEMENT
With the outbreak of the financial crisis – which may be dated back to the sum-
mer of 2007 when a loss of confidence by investors in the value of securitized
mortgages in the United States triggered a liquidity crisis – the Great Moderation
era came to an end (illustrative in this regard is the steep increase in GDP volatil-
ity in figure 1). The rosy view that the combination of better risk management,
10 In any case by market participants, who were to some extent misled by the fact that a number of shocks hit the
financial system without causing major turmoil (like Enron, WorldCom, the crash of the dotcom bubble, the
Icelandic crisis in 2006, downgrades of major US companies, etc.). Warnings by the authorities on the possibility
of an abrupt correction in financial markets date back to at least 2004 (see, for instance, Annual reports by the
BIS; TRICHET (2008); WELLINK (2008)). Also academics stressed the danger of systemic breakdowns as a side
effect of risk diversification and financial innovation; see, e.g., DE VRIES (2005), HONOHAN (2008a).
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new financial products and more complete financial markets would result in a
situation with increased macroeconomic stability, turned out to be an illusion.
There is growing evidence that the Great Moderation itself was one of the causes
of the financial crisis11, because it strengthened the mistaken belief of lenders and
investors that high volatility was a thing of the past. This in turn encouraged them
to increase their leverage and risk-taking activities12. Moreover, during the past
decades financial organisations were allowed to become larger and more complex
based on the argument that the combination of more diversification and
advanced risk management techniques would allow these bigger firms to be more
effective risk managers than smaller, less-sophisticated organisations (Blair,
2009). With the outbreak of the financial crisis, however, the darker side of the
risk paradox became visible: it became increasingly clear that there had been a
significant and wide-spread underestimation of risks across financial markets,
financial institutions and countries (Trichet, 2009). For a variety of reasons, mar-
ket participants did not accurately measure the risk inherent in financial innova-
tions and/or understand the impact of financial innovations on the overall liquid-
ity and stability of the financial system. Indeed, there is growing evidence that
some categories of risks associated with financial innovations were not internal-
ised by markets; for example, tail risks were underpriced and systematic risk (as
externality) was not or inadequately priced. This wide-spread underestimation of
risks turned out to be at the core of the financial crisis.
The underestimation of risks reflected in our view to an important degree the
inadequacy of risk management systems of financial institutions. During the
unfolding of the crisis, many financial institutions revealed a huge concentration
of risks, suggesting that risk management systems failed to identify key sources of
risks, to assess how much risk was accumulated and to price financial risks prop-
erly13. The underlying problem was that risk management did not keep pace with
the risks and uncertainty inherent in financial innovations and the fast-changing
financial landscape. Risk managers trusted too much the existing risk models and
techniques, while underlying assumptions were not critically evaluated. Unfortu-
nately, the use of these models proved to be inadequate, both from a technical and
a conceptual point of view. On top of this, there are indications that risk manage-
11 Hyman Minsky’s instability hypothesis can be used to demonstrate that the Great Moderation period contained
indeed the seeds for the financial crisis in the form of spiralling debt that investors have incurred in order to
finance speculative investments: “The second theorem of the financial instability hypothesis is that over periods
of prolonged prosperity, the economy transits from financial relations that make for a stable system to financial
relations that make for an unstable system” (MINSKY (1992), p. 8).
12 Note however that it is still debated whether the Great Moderation can be considered as one of the causes of
the financial crisis. As TRICHET (2008) points out: “The correlation between the reduction of volatilities and
the magnitude of risk taking is there, but the direction and even the existence of a possible causality, remains
an open question”.
13 In this context, TRICHET (2008) makes the appealing distinction between the “underpricing of a unit of risk”
(i.e. inadequate assumptions about the distributions of returns to highly complex, new financial securities) and
the “under appreciation of the quantity of risk” (i.e. failure to identify the quantity of risk that financial insti-
tutions were accumulating).
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ment fell short from a qualitative dimension point-of-view, that is, too little atten-
tion was paid to corporate governance processes, the architecture and culture of
organisations, business ethics, incentives and people. In sum, risk management
fell short from two angles: (1) too much reliance on the quantitative side and (2)
too little on the qualitative side of risk management.
2.3.1. The limits of quantitative risk management
On a conceptual (or methodological) level, the financial crisis brought to light
that the risk management discipline had developed too much into a pseudo quan-
titative science with pretensions beyond its real risk management capabilities. To
put it plainly, in the years prior to the financial crisis, the risk management disci-
pline relied far too much on sophisticated mathematical risk management models
and techniques that proved not capable to deal with the complexities and struc-
tural fragilities of the new financial landscape. The over-reliance on sophisticated
though inadequate risk management models and techniques contributed to a false
sense of security (Honohan, 2008a), reinforced by booming financial markets. As
a consequence of these simultaneous developments, the risk management disci-
pline suffered from overconfidence, a phenomenon that happened also to mone-
tary theory and policy in the early 2000s (see Brakman et al., 2001). Increasingly,
the idea that outcomes were perfectly under control took firmly hold. It was
assumed that quantitative risk management models represented stable and relia-
ble stochastic descriptions of reality. While this might be a reasonable assumption
in the world of classic physics, this is certainly not the case in a fast-moving,
innovative financial landscape, in which prices of financial instruments are not
only driven by objective probabilities (which can be derived from past distribu-
tion functions), but also by waves of optimism and pessimism based on self-ful-
filling momentum, mood and animal spirits (Keynes, 1937; Turner, 2007). In such
an environment the validity of quantitative models becomes highly precarious
(Blommestein, 2009). Ironically, by relying to an increasing degree on sophisti-
cated mathematical models and techniques, the risk management discipline lost
its ability to deal with the fundamental role of uncertainty in the financial sys-
tem14.
14 While modellers were certainly aware of the limitations and weaknesses of these models and assumptions, the
“users” in the financial industry were often ill-informed and ignorant about the snags of using these kinds of
models, despite warnings from modellers, see e.g. MERTON (1994): “The mathematics of hedging models are
precise, but the models are not, being only approximations to the complex, real world. Their accuracy as a
useful approximation to that world varies considerably across time and place. The practitioner should therefore
apply the models only tentatively, assessing their limitations carefully in each application”.
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2.3.2. Uncertainty versus risk
There are different views on what uncertainty is from an ontological point-of-
view (Hoogduin, 1987; Dequech, 2000; Ben-Haim and Demertzis, 2008), and
how it differs from risk. The differentiation between uncertainty and risk can be
predominantly traced back to Knight (1921), who defines risk as imperfect
knowledge where the probability of the possible outcomes is known, and uncer-
tainty exists when these probabilities are not known15. While Keynes shared
Knight’s resistance to the possibility of the measurement of uncertainty, Keynes
stressed – especially in his later economic writings – the concept of fundamental
uncertainty: “where there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable
probability whatsoever. We simply do not know” (Keynes, 1937, pp. 213-214).
As emphasized by Dequech (2000), this type of fundamental uncertainty refers to
situations which are essentially characterised by the possibility of creativity and
structural change and therefore by a significant indeterminacy of the future. This
indeterminacy stems from the fact that the future is yet to be created and hinges
crucially on the (uncertain) actions of economic agents. More importantly, in the
face of such ignorance, Keynes (1937) argued that in real-life we rely on conven-
tions such as “the future will be similar to the present”. He also noted that, as a
result, economic agents attach more importance to the present than is warranted.
In addition, agents also attach great weight to the opinion of others in situations
with fundamental uncertainty. This implies that herd behaviour is a dominant
feature of uncertain situations where objective decision criteria do not exist
(Brakman et al., 2001, p. 4)16. In fact, this mechanism is an important driver of
procyclicality in the financial system, i.e. the tendency of the financial system to
accumulate too much risk and leverage in good times and to shed risks abruptly
during a downturn, thereby increasing up- and down-side swings. This type of
herd behaviour – which we have witnessed very clearly during the global financial
crisis – is not captured by conventional risk management models. Prior to the
financial crisis, the risk management discipline relied increasingly on sophisti-
cated models and techniques, while ignoring the fact that much of the behaviour
of economic agents cannot be modelled using a standard stochastic framework,
especially in situations with an important degree of fundamental uncertainty and
contagious behaviour.
15 BLOMMESTEIN (2008a) argues that with increased knowledge and measurement precision Knightian uncertainty
might become randomness with knowable probabilities (thus risk). The ongoing financial crisis is testimony
however that the three necessary conditions for the proper pricing of risk derived in that paper are not fulfilled
in practice. This implies that risk managers need to learn how to deal with uncertainty.
16 Or, in KEYNES (1937, pp. 214-215) own words: “In particular, being based on so flimsy a foundation, it [i.e. a
practical theory of the future] is subject to sudden and violent changes. The practice of calmness and immobility,
of certainty and security, suddenly breaks down. New fears and hopes will, without warning take charge of
human conduct. The forces of disillusion may suddenly impose a new conventional basis of valuation.” With
hindsight, it turns out that KEYNES’ (1937) analysis describes a great deal of recent behaviour in financial
markets.
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2.3.3. Technical problems
In addition to this fundamental methodological problem, the financial crisis
revealed technical failures in risk management in the sense that even sophisticated
methods and techniques turned out not to be refined enough. At the core of many
risk management systems was (is) the concept of Value-At-Risk (VAR), which
became a key tool in the quantification of risk, the evaluation of risk/return trade-
offs, and in the disclosure of risk appetite to regulators and shareholders17. This
concept is effectively based on the idea that the analysis of past price movement
patterns could deliver statistically robust inferences relating to the probability of
price movements in the future (FSA, 2009). However, the financial crisis revealed
the following severe problems with applying the VAR concept to the world of
complex longer-term social and economic relationships.
First, measures of VAR were often estimated using relatively short periods of
observation, since the instruments whose returns were being modelled were rela-
tively new. This implied not only that “rare” events like a sharp drop in housing
prices were outside the sample period and thus not captured by the model, but
also that significant procyclicality was introduced, with periods of low observed
risk driving down measures of future prospective risks (FSA, 2009).
Second, most models used for risk management assume that the full distribution
of possible events is normal in shape, although there is no a priori and empirically
robust justification for a normal shape distribution of events in financial markets.
On the contrary, by now it is well established that financial returns exhibit fat
tails and that risks in the financial sector are non-normally distributed (de Vries,
2005)18. Illustrative in this regard is the following example, borrowed from Brou-
wer (2009); in the past 100 years, it happened 48 times that stock prices fell by
7% in one day, while the probability that this would happen assuming a normal
distribution is almost infinitesimally small (i.e., once in 300.000 years!)19. Impor-
tantly, the fat tails which characterise financial sector risks are not some kind of
exogenous “natural phenomenon”, but an inherent (endogenous) part of the
financial system, given that the system is to an important degree involved in matu-
rity transformation. This means that the system is exposed to liquidity risk. And
especially liquidity risks make the system vulnerable to “tail events”. Indeed, with
all banks trying to sell at the same time (i.e. a sharp increase in liquidity prefer-
ence), liquidity may suddenly evaporate as a result of the simultaneous copy-cat
17 Ironically enough, the October 1987 crash marked the birth of VAR as a key risk management tool. For a very
brief history of the birth of VAR, see HALDANE (2009).
18 Of special concern in this regard are so-called “Black Swan” events which are highly improbable events which
have a huge impact if they materialise.
19 One could wonder why market participant nevertheless assume a normal distribution. Besides the fact that
normal distributions simplify calculations tremendously, this could be explained by disaster myopia, i.e. agents’
propensity to underestimate the probability of adverse outcomes, in particular small probability events from the
distant past (HALDANE (2009)).
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behaviour of banks, resulting into a complete drying up of market liquidity and
heightened financial market distress. Risk management models (based on normal
distribution functions) were often not able to deal adequately with complex inter-
actions, such as those between changes in asset values, leverage and liquidity risk.
Finally, and related to the failure to capture fat tail risks, VAR-based estimates of
risks fail to capture adequately systemic risks20. As noted, VAR models typically
do not take into account that developments in financial markets will induce sim-
ilar and simultaneous behaviour by other market participants. This is, however,
a deeply misleading assumption, because market participants often display simi-
lar behaviour, especially in situations of stress. However, the simultaneous pursuit
of identical micro strategies may lead to mechanically-induced contagion and
may generate an unexpected macro outcome that actually jeopardizes the success
of the underlying micro strategies (Blommestein, 2009). Indeed, if market partic-
ipants display similar behaviour, VAR measures of risk may indicate that risk is
low and falling at the precise time when systemic risk is high and rising. De Vries
(2005) and others show that the potential for systemic breakdown is strong if the
underlying distributions have heavy tails, while it is weak if distributions have a
normal shape.
2.3.4. The minor role of qualitative risk management
On top of these fundamental and technical difficulties of risk management and
despite the fact that qualitative risk management is particularly important to deal
with fundamental uncertainty, risk management in many financial institutions
paid insufficient attention to the qualitative dimension, involving issues such as
organisation, governance21, incentives, processes and people. For instance, in
some cases information about risk exposures of the firm never reached senior
levels of management levels as well as the board (Kirkpatrick, 2009). In other
cases, risk management turned out to be activity-based rather than enterprise-
based. In fact, many financial institutions signalled that they had implemented
enterprise-wide risk management, but the financial crisis showed that in many
instances this was not, or only superficially, the case. With the unfolding of the
crisis, it turned out that financial institutions failed to consolidate information on
enterprise-wide exposure and to supplement this with effective risk controls at the
enterprise level22. This implied that risk was not managed on an enterprise-wide
basis, which naturally undermined the ability to take strategic risk decisions
(Blommestein, 2008b; OECD, 2009).
20 Note that risks are to an important degree “fungible” and therefore related to each other. For example, liquidity
risk and systemic risk are strongly interrelated.
21 For an overview of corporate governance issues, see OECD (2009).
22 For instance because enterprise VAR estimates are often put together in such a way that it hampers enterprise-
wide risk stress testing, see ROWE (2006).
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But the governance issue which received most attention are structural flaws in
compensation schemes resulting in excessive risk-taking. Many compensation
schemes in financial institutions were designed so that traders and senior manage-
ment benefit from the upside of risky behaviour while they are not or much less
exposed to the downside23. As a consequence of these ill-designed (asymmetric)
compensation schemes and other corporate governance problems within large
financial institutions (see Calomiris, 2009)24, important financial institutions had
perverse incentives to promote high-risk activities and strategies. These perverse
incentives amplified excessive risk-taking that, in turn, severely threatened the
global financial systems (FSF, 2009).
Compensation systems had been designed to give incentives to employees to max-
imise short-term profits and to attract and retain talented employees, while risk
management systems had been designed to inform board and/or senior manage-
ment about the risk exposure of the firm. However, most financial institutions
viewed compensation systems as being unrelated to risk management and risk
governance (FSF, 2009). Moreover, risk management was to an increasingly large
extent treated as a separate discipline, i.e. separate from senior management. In
addition, in an environment with a constant flux of innovations, senior manage-
ment and board were often ignorant of the exact risk characteristics of these inno-
vations. Naturally this affected their ability to judge the risk characteristics of
(seemingly) highly profitable complex products (Turnball, 2009). As a result of
this, as well as the highly complex nature of risk strategies, it was increasingly
difficult for senior management and board to assess and exercise judgement over
the risks being taken, notwithstanding the fact that risk governance is a key
responsibility of the board. Given the insufficient influence of risk management
departments in combination with the limitations of senior management and
board to properly understand and control risks, the “Wizards of Wall Street”
were able to keep financial institutions operating in high-risk areas that generated
high bonuses for everybody.
2.4. LESSONS LEARNT AND SUGGESTIONS FOR MOVING 
FORWARD
The global financial crisis revealed very clearly the need for fundamental changes
at both macro and micro levels. Indeed, at the macro level a structural rethinking
of the design of an increasingly complex and interconnected international finan-
23 For example, successful traders can make fortunes, while those that fail simply lose their job (in most cases they
move on to a trading job in other financial institutions). Similarly, CEOs of institutions that suffer massive losses
walk away with very generous severance and retirement packages, see BLOMMESTEIN (2008a). Note however
that there are different forms of bonuses and not all of them translate in excessive risk-taking behaviour.
24 CALOMIRIS (2009) stresses that corporate governance within large financial institutions was virtually impossible
as a result of government regulations limiting who can buy stocks in banks.
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cial landscape is urgently required. In particular the question how to deal with the
higher level of systemic risks in this increasingly complex landscape requires
urgent attention, along with the question what reforms in supervision and regu-
lation are needed to minimize the risk of repetition of another financial crisis of
this scale. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to address the required
reforms at the macro level (but, for an extensive overview of possible reforms at
the macro level, see FSA, 2009, BIS, 2009, and Banque de France, 2009, among
many others). Instead, this section focuses on lessons learnt from the past episode
of inadequate risk management at an institutional (micro) level.
2.4.1. What have we learnt from a conceptual perspective?
From a conceptual point of view, the financial crisis has demonstrated clearly that
risk management as a discipline has lost track of its fundamental role of dealing
adequately with uncertainty in the financial system. This happened exactly at the
time when, as a result of an innovation-driven fast-changing financial landscape,
the existence of fundamental uncertainty was increasingly important. To decrease
the probability and severity of another global financial crisis, the risk manage-
ment discipline should not only acknowledge in a frank and open way the poten-
tial technical weaknesses (limitations) of risk management models, but also take
the existence of fundamental uncertainty more seriously. This would include
acknowledging the dangers of model misspecification and/or mis-application and
by paying explicit and rigorous attention to the question how to deal with uncer-
tainty rather than trying to measure risks at all costs and in situations where this
is clearly not warranted. But what does this paradigm shift imply at a more prac-
tical level?
The existence of complications such as fat tails and the fact that it is inherently
impossible to discover the “true” model of financial risk events, lead to the cen-
tral conclusion of this study that effective risk management requires a different
and more comprehensive approach to risk management, in which firm-wide
exposures and risks are constantly evaluated against the background of a fast-
moving environment characterised by fundamental uncertainty. Such an
approach to risk (and uncertainty) management requires that market participants
should be aware of the possibility that the simultaneous pursuit of identical micro
strategies may lead to synchronous behaviour and model-induced contagion25.
For example, the recent crisis showed that a major dimension of tail risk concerns
liquidity risk where market liquidity might completely dry-up. This type of chal-
lenges to risk-management requires not only a sufficient degree of flexibility in
the management of risk at the corporate specific level, but also the recognition of
25 In other words, there is always the possibility that liquidity suddenly evaporates, with inevitable consequences
for asset valuations and solvencies.
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the importance of psychological factors driving the behaviour of market partici-
pants. At a very fundamental level this approach requires the introduction of
interactions among economic agents together with all sorts of cognitive distor-
tions that can then be used to analyze collective changes in behaviour in (finan-
cial) markets (Blommestein, 2009). This would also necessitate the use of adap-
tive (rather than static) risk management processes26 and more flexibility to
respond to a fast-moving financial landscape (Blommestein, 2006b). Contingency
planning, scenario analyses, extensive stress tests, “no regret policies” are exam-
ples of approaches to deal with “unquantifiable27” uncertainty. They go clearly
beyond the scope of a conventional risk management framework.
Furthermore, recent evidence has shown that firms who relied on a wide range of
risk measures to gather information and who took different perspectives on the
same risk exposures than other financial institutions were in a much better posi-
tion to cope with adverse developments (Senior Supervisors Group, 2008; Bern-
anke, 2008; OECD, 2009). This finding supports our contention that a compre-
hensive or holistic approach to risk management is essential. Such an approach
involves both quantitative aspects and qualitative features such as the organisa-
tion of internal risk controls, transparency in financial reporting and disclosures
and legal clarity (Schmidt Bies, 2004). But also more attention to issues such as
the firm’s culture and the necessity of a timely and effective internal communica-
tion structure (in order to share information efficiently across the firm), are
required. Effective risk management must be practiced throughout the firm and
integrated in the firm’s business model, thereby encouraging more responsible
behaviour focused on the longer-term health of institutions and avoiding exces-
sive risk-taking.
The financial crisis has clearly shown the impact of structural weaknesses in the
corporate governance structure and the need for reform, in particular via urgently
needed changes in the relationship between risk managers, board of directors and
top management. An improvement in the firm’s corporate governance structure
and its integration with the risk management function is in our view a necessary
response to deal with fundamental uncertainty. In this context, the primary
responsibility for the corporate strategy and related risk management strategy lies
with the board of directors and top management. Risk management is simply too
important to be left to a chief risk manager, since it is (or should be) an integral
part of all banking activities. This implies that a sound risk management system
must be fully integrated with a firm’s business model (Blommestein, 2008b). It is
the board of directors who is ultimately responsible for the risk strategy, involving
decisions about risk exposure at all levels of the firm. The design of a sound
26 This may also require the use of the adaptive market concept instead of models based on the efficient market
hypothesis.
27 And, thus, unmanageable for standard risk models.
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corporate governance structure also includes the architecture of remuneration
schemes. Understanding the links between incentives and risk-taking is a critical
component of effective risk management (Bernanke, 2009). Causation does not
only run from compensation structure to risk profile but also in the opposite
direction, because inadequate risk controls can undermine the effectiveness of
sound compensation schemes. For example, in a situation where weak risk-con-
trol systems would allow traders to build up huge losses that would eliminate
profits made by other parts of the bank. As noted, there was the tendency in many
financial institutions to decouple compensation systems from risk management
(Noyer, 2009). Instead, risk management systems should assess the (potential)
influence of the structure of compensation systems on the risk-profile28. Bonuses
and other compensation sources should provide incentives to behave in ways that
promote the long-run health of financial institutions29.
2.4.2. Limits of risk modelling: what have we learnt from 
a technical perspective?
From a technical perspective, the financial crisis revealed that there are severe
problems with applying VAR techniques and other standard quantitative tech-
niques for risk management. For example, VAR is not sub-additive (Artzner et al.,
1999), while generating very inaccurate risk forecasts (Danielsson, 2002). More
in general, it is very hard to develop risk models that can be used in a practical
and reliable way in the world of complex and dynamic social and economic rela-
tionships. Replacing standard models such as VAR by alternative risk measures
tend to be overly complex and/or impossible to implement in everyday situations
(Danielsson, 2009). In this context, it has been noted (e.g. Bernanke, 2008;
2009), that robustness is a desirable feature of risk management methods. The
theory of robust control provides a toolbox of techniques that may be helpful in
this regard (Colander et al., 2008). However, also stress tests and scenario analy-
ses are promising avenues to augment standard risk models as these tools can
provide valuable information for detecting risks in complex environments.
Indeed, these kind of exercises forces risk managers to think through the implica-
tions of scenarios that may seem relatively unlikely but that could pose serious
risks to the firm when they would materialize, requiring managers to think “out-
side the box”.
28 In other words, supervisors should scrutinise more thoroughly whether the combined structure of corporate
governance, compensation schemes and risk controls encourages excessive risk-taking.
29 In conformity with the FSF Principles for Sound Compensation Practices (see: FSF (2009)) and Principles for a
controlled remuneration policy (see: AUTORITEIT F INANCIËLE M ARKTEN and DE N EDERLANDSCHE B ANK
(2009)).
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To that end, stress tests and scenarios should allow the modelling of the conse-
quences of extreme events so that they constitute a tail event. For instance, sce-
narios and tests that allow for abnormally large market moves, the evaporation
of market liquidity and/or periods of prolonged market distress. In addition, it is
imperative that the spill-over and contagion consequences of the firms’ own
actions and that of others actions are taken into account, including in particular
the second round effects of stresses in the system (i.e., network externalities). This
will put firms in a better position to internalise network externalities that have
played such an important problem during the ongoing global crisis (Haldane,
2009).
2.5. CONCLUSION
Although the global financial crisis revealed very clearly the need for fundamental
changes at the macro level (which are currently being discussed extensively in
various international forums), this paper focussed on the need for urgent changes
that address weaknesses of risk management systems at the level of financial insti-
tutions. Our key conclusion is that (i) the underestimation and underpricing of
risk as well as (ii) confusion over the difference between uncertainty and risks
were at the core of the ongoing financial crisis. The resulting mismanagement of
risk was in part due to the complexity and opaqueness of a fast-moving, innova-
tive financial landscape, which strained the ability of market participants to price
risks correctly and resulted in an increase in systemic risk. But also the inade-
quacy of risk management systems in a narrower, technical sense contributed to
the underpricing of risks.
The problems are in our view first and foremost of a conceptual nature. The
financial crisis brought to light that risk management had become too much a
pseudo quantitative science with pretentions outstripping quantitative risk man-
agement capabilities of most financial institutions. There was a profound lack of
understanding of the role of fundamental uncertainty and confusion over the dif-
ference between risk and uncertainty. Indeed, the fact that many financial deci-
sions have to be taken in a rapidly changing environment characterised by a high
degree of (fundamental) uncertainty (rather than risk) was largely ignored. This
in turn had adverse consequences for the way risk management and decision
making were organised in financial institutions. There was an exaggerated sense
of confidence in quantitative risk models and measurement and too little appre-
ciation for the key role of the qualitative side of risk management (e.g. informa-
tion flows, people and their incentives/motives). Moreover, even from a purely
technical perspective, risk management models and techniques turned out not to
be sophisticated enough. In particular, the financial crisis revealed that there are
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severe problems with applying VAR techniques and enterprise-wide risk manage-
ment to a world with rapidly changing social and economic relationships.
In sum, important lessons can be learnt from the past episode of inadequate risk
management. We showed that there was too much reliance on the quantitative
side and too little on the qualitative side of risk management. But we also argued
that there is a need for a greater emphasis on dealing with fundamental uncer-
tainty. More sophistication and a further refinement of existing risk management
models and techniques is not the most important or effective response. Too much
emphasis on a new generation of complex risk models might even lead to similar
risk management problems as during the last decade. Instead, a more holistic and
broader approach to risk management is needed as part of a paradigm shift where
more attention is given to the qualitative dimension of risk (and uncertainty)
management. This includes the best practice that top managers are actively and
directly engaged in the management of the risks confronting their organisation at
the strategic level, including the link between risk-taking and incentive structures.
But even when the changes in risk management systems proposed in this paper
have been implemented, financial institutions will continue to grapple with a
future that is highly uncertain and in which human nature can be expected to
remain largely unchanged. For example, experience and laboratory tests show
that most humans have an ingrained tendency to underestimate outliers and to
take sometimes huge risks in their efforts to earn money. Furthermore, asset mar-
kets have a tendency to generate a pattern of bubbles followed by crashes (Blom-
mestein, 2008a), that may or may not be transmitted to foreign markets.
This means in our view that regardless of future technical improvements in risk
management practices and techniques, and notwithstanding further progress in
macroeconomic policies and more effective macro-prudential supervision that
would remove (for long periods of time) potential sources of volatility, we will
still have to brace ourselves periodically for financial crisis that are essentially
self-generated. After all, fundamental uncertainty is a fact of life. This means that
finding improved ways of dealing with fundamental uncertainty will remain a
continuous challenge for financial institutions and supervisors alike.
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3. BANKING IN TIMES OF CRISIS: 
THE CASE OF RABOBANK
Wim W. Boonstra1
INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis, that started in 2007 and had its climax with the fall of Leh-
man Brothers in the autumn of 2008, created many victims in the financial world.
Many banks ran into severe problems and needed additional liquidity from cen-
tral banks or government support. Quite a large number of them have either been
nationalized or have received massive capital injections from governments.
The Dutch cooperative Rabobank is one of the most remarkable exceptions. In
this crisis, it has turned out to be one of the most stable banks of the world. It
survived the crisis years 2007 and 2008 relatively unscathed and it is the only
large bank in the Netherlands that did not need government support. This raises
the question: is Rabobank a more stable bank or has it just been lucky? And the
second question, of course, is: if Rabobank is a more stable bank, what can be
learned from its experience?
In this article, I will start with introducing Rabobank. Special attention will be
given to its business model, the way its governance is organized and its strategy.
Next, its experience during the crisis will be discussed in more detail. Following
this, the topic will be broadened to the question of whether cooperative banks
have an impact on the financial system in which they operate. Finally, after some
brief thoughts on the future of the banking system, some conclusions will be pre-
sented.
3.1. RABOBANK
For a number of years, Rabobank has been the only private bank in the world
with a AAA rating from both Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s. It ranks in the
top 20 of banks in the world, measured by equity. This is a long way from its
origins as a humble microfinance institution in the Dutch countryside.
1 Wim Boonstra is Chief Economist of Rabobank Nederland. In writing this article he received support form Niek
Vogelaar, Harry de Roo, Hans Groeneveld, Bouke de Vries and August Sjauw-Koen-Fa. All remaining errors
are the author’s responsibility.
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3.1.1. Historical development
The history of Rabobank started in the middle of the 1890s with the establish-
ment of small microfinance institutions in the Dutch countryside. This was part
of a broader cooperative movement in continental Europe. Starting in Germany
in 1864, when the first German credit cooperative was established by Friedrich
Wilhelm Raiffeisen, cooperative banks were set up over large parts of the Euro-
pean continent. They were established in reaction to a major market failure of the
time: access to finance against acceptable conditions was miserable in the coun-
tryside. Traditional banks were hardly active outside the cities and farmers could
only borrow money from usurers against prohibitive conditions. The cooperative
movement spread very rapidly over the continent and in the Netherlands in 1900
already 67 credit cooperatives were active. In June 1898 the first umbrella organ-
ization was established (the Coöperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-Bank in Utrecht),
quickly followed by the Coöperatieve Centrale Boerenleenbank in Eindhoven
(December 1898). These institutions organized the activities with a regional or
national dimension, organized money market facilities and liquidity support for
member banks and, already in the 1920s, organized micro-prudential supervision
on local cooperative banks on behalf of the group [Mooij, 2009].
Table 1: Key figures Rabobank
Source: Rabobank, annual reports
Over time, Rabobank gradually lost its microfinance character and developed
into an all-finance institution. Initially, the Dutch central bank had its doubts
about the strength of the cooperative banks. Its worries concerned above all their
weak capitalization at the time. Moreover, their interest margins were lower than
those of their commercial counterparts. On their part, the cooperatives argued
that they felt that, due to peer pressure, their credit quality was better than that
of other banks. As the cooperative banks were not able to convince the central
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Figure 1: Market shares cooperative banks in savings deposits
Source: Annual reports Rabobank, Meijs (2002)
After the financial crisis of the 1920s, in which the Dutch cooperative banking
sector indeed appeared to be more crisis-proof than many commercial banks, the
principle of cooperative banking was widely accepted and access to the central
banking facilities was fully restored (Mooij, 2009). Gradually the local microfi-
nance institutions developed into fully-fledged banks offering a broad range of
products. In the 1960s they expanded into urban areas2. In 1972, the Boerenleen-
bank and Raiffeisenbank organizations merged into the Rabobank, which today
is the largest banking group in the Netherlands, with an average market share of
some 30% in its home market. In agriculture, where its roots are, the Rabobank
market share lies between 80 and 90% of the Dutch market.
Table 2: Market position of Rabobank
Source: Rabobank, annual reports
2 One of the mysteries of history is the fact that the initial success of cooperative banking in the Netherlands was
limited to the countryside. In this respect, the Dutch developments differed form those in Germany, were Genos-
senschaftsbanken and Volksbanken developed more or less parallel. It was certainly tried to introduce coopera-
tive banking in the Dutch cities, but al these efforts, such as Hanzebanken, Boazbanken and Middenstands-
banken, ran into serious problems in the 1920s and failed. The government had to step in to fill the gap, estab-
lishing the predecessor of the Nederlandse Middenstandbank, that later became part of ING (BOONSTRA (2009)).
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In 1980 Rabobank took its first steps abroad by opening a representative office
in New York. Since then, its international expansion has been relatively rapid.
Today, it has more than 500 branches in 28 countries. Until the mid 1990s the
local lending activities of the Rabobank could be more than completely funded
by savings deposits. Gradually, however, the lending activities grew faster than
savings, forcing the bank to turn to wholesale funding for its domestic activities.
At the end of the 1990s Rabobank formulated the ambition to develop into a
major international investment bank. This initiative, however, proved to be short-
lived (see below).
3.1.2. Rabobank’s cooperative identity
As Rabobank evolved from a chain of locally active credit cooperatives into a full
fledged financial service provider, it gradually seemed to lose its cooperative char-
acter. Many observers in the outside world hardly recognized it as a different
bank when compared with its non-cooperative peers. The cooperative structure
of Rabobank was scarcely used in its communication, the membership base
(which was not very actively used) was declining and many clients barely realized
the difference in business model between Rabobank and its peers in the financial
sector. Although it was widely known that Rabobank was not quoted on the
stock exchange, it was hardly recognized that the underlying business model is
different from other banks. Among the people who knew, many had the opinion
that the cooperative organization model was a 19th century relict that badly fitted
a modern bank. Even within the bank itself this sentiment was wide-spread,
which resulted in pressure to convert Rabobank into a commercial bank and list
it at the stock exchange. In reaction to this, the executive board opened the so-
called cooperation debate, in which all stakeholders were involved. This debate,
which ran from 1995 to 1998, resulted in a number of conclusions, which can be
summarized as3:
1. Rabobank would retain its cooperative structure and would not convert into
a listed commercial bank. The motivation was that the bank felt that its so-
called stakeholder model is better fitted for the financial services industry
than the shareholder model;
2. the cooperative structure of the Rabobank should be emphasized;
3. the membership based should be expanded and actively developed.
Since then, due to an intensive effort to increase the membership base, the number
of members has grown from 0.6 million in 1998 to 1.7 million in 2009. This is
not the right place to dwell on the series of local initiatives that were developed
at local levels to activate the Rabobank membership base. For the context of this
3 The full list of conclusions can be found in Meijs (2002).
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paper it is important to realize that it was not a coincidence, but an explicit and
well-motivated decision not to list Rabobank on the stock exchange. The recent
increase in popularity of the cooperative model in banking in reaction to the crisis
underlines the foresight of this decision.
Figure 2: Number of local cooperative banks and membership base (1900-2008)
3.1.3. Structure of the Rabobank Group
The foundation of the Rabobank Group is formed by the local member banks.
Today, there are some 150 local Rabobanks in the Dutch market. This followed
a rapid decline after a peak of 1228 in 1970 just before the merger of the two
central organizations into Rabobank. During the last decade, the decline in the
number of local banks has accelerated, shown by the fact that the number of
member banks in the group decreased form 397 as recently as 2000 to today’s
number of 152. This decline, which is part of a major efficiency drive, was
entirely the result of mergers between small banks in order to improve scale econ-
omies. Local Rabobanks have a high degree of autonomy in the region where they
are active. They all are individual legal entities, with their own profit and loss
account and balance sheet responsibility. Together the local banks own
Rabobank Nederland, the central organization. Rabobank Nederland organizes
a series of central functions, such as ICT, payments systems, communication,
research and risk management on a group level. Moreover, all funding operations
are centralized within Rabobank Nederland. Therefore, individual Rabobanks
have no direct access to financial markets. All funding surpluses and deficits of
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Rabobank Nederland also runs, via its division Rabobank International, the for-
eign network of the Group. In addition, it also owns a series of domestic special-
ized subsidiaries, such as Robeco (asset management), De Lage Landen (leasing)
and Schretlen (private banking), and it has a 37% share in the Insurance group
Eureko.
Figure 3: Structure Rabobank Group
Compared to most other cooperative banking groups Rabobank has a very coher-
ent structure. The strongest binding factor is its cross-guarantee, under which any
individual Rabobank guarantees the obligations of all other member banks. As a
result of this guarantee system, Rabobank is treated as a consolidated entity for
the regulatory supervision, of solvency, liquidity and other controls. The Dutch
central bank (DNB), which is responsible for the supervision of Dutch banks, has
delegated supervision of the individual local Rabobanks to Rabobank Nederland.
3.1.4. Governance and ownership issues
Although the local Rabobanks are the owners of Rabobank Nederland and there-
fore are ultimately “the boss” of the Rabobank Group, the actual power balance
within the group is considerably more delicate. On the one hand, all strategic
decisions are made or approved by the central delegate committee (Centrale
Kringvergadering, CKV), which consists of representatives of local banks. This
makes the CKV the most important institution within the Rabobank Group. On
the other hand, Rabobank Nederland has power over the local banks originating
from two sources. First, it holds delegated authority over local banks as a result
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icy decisions for the group as a whole, Rabobank Nederland assures that every
individual member bank sticks to the “club rules”. Second, especially its role as
guardian of the cross-guarantee system (see above) and its role as banking super-
visor, it has a strong influence over the local banks. As a result, the power balance
within the Rabobank Group is a delicate equilibrium between the local banks on
the one hand and the central organization on the other. Decision making can be
time consuming, because many stakeholders are involved. This disadvantage is
usually compensated by the fact that, once decisions have been made, implemen-
tation can proceed relatively quickly as most relevant stakeholders have already
been involved in the decision making process.
The ownership structure of the Rabobank Group is even more complex. Nobody
owns Rabobank, the bank “owns itself”. By far the largest part of its capital base
comes from retained profits which have been built up over a century of profitable
banking. All profits are retained,and there is no dividend for member banks. In
addition, tier-1 capital was attracted by issuing hybrid instruments such as trust
securities and membership certificates. Members have no claim on the capital: it
is so-called “locked in” value. And although in principle member banks can
decide to leave the group, the costs of doing this are so high that it is only a
theoretical option. Finally members, although they have a limited say in the
bank’s policy, cannot decide to convert it into a listed company and take out the
capital, as happened in the UK with the mutual sector (Llewellyn, 2009).
Table 2 gives the key figures of Rabobank. It shows the strong growth over the
decades and the most important ratios. It also shows the way diversification pays
off, which was well illuminated by the developments in 2008. In spite of substan-
tial losses due to the financial crisis in the US, Rabobank’s net profit reached an
all-time high that year. This was the result of a extremely strong performance by
the local banks in the Dutch retail market (see below).
3.1.5. The cooperative business model
Cooperative banks are different from commercial banks in many respects
(Diepenbeek, 2009). It starts with their origins. Cooperative banks were estab-
lished in reaction to market failures. At the time of their establishment, access to
finance for farmers and craftsmen in the countryside was seriously problematic.
Traditional banks were hardly or not at all active outside the cities, leaving the
farmers at the mercy of money brokers that granted credit against extreme con-
ditions. Usury was a wide-spread phenomenon in those days. The establishment
of cooperative banks changed this. Not only did their arrival improve access to
credit for farmers and craftsmen, it also brought opportunities for people to
employ their savings in a more productive way. Moreover, they undermined the
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market power of the other suppliers of financial services in the countryside, the
aforementioned usurers. Until today, cooperative banks claim that their presence
in the market has a disciplinary impact on the market behavior of other entities.
As discussed earlier when introducing Rabobank, there are substantial differ-
ences in ownership and governance structure between cooperative banks on the
one hand and listed banks on the other. Another important difference is the fact
that cooperative banks, in contrast with commercial banks, do not aim at maxi-
mum profits. They have a so-called multiple bottom line, in which the interests of
all important stakeholders are taken into account. Sound profitability is, of
course, of major importance for cooperative banks, because profits are by far the
most important source of capital. A slowdown in profitability translates immedi-
ately into a lower growth potential.
3.1.6. Rabobank’s strategy
Like most banks Rabobank made changes to its strategy over time. Early strategic
moves consisted of the move into urban areas (1960s), the international expansion
(starting in 1980) and the creation of an all-finance institution in the Dutch market
(starting in the 1980s). This strategy was underpinned by a series of acquisitions.
Since the 1990s the strategy in its home market has been by and large very consist-
ent: Rabobank has the explicit aim to be the market leader, to be measured in
market shares, in all market segments in the Dutch market. In retail banking it is
indeed the largest player, although over the years ING was an important compet-
itor. In wholesale banking Rabobank remains a runner up in third position, after
ABN Amro and ING. However, during the crisis the Dutch banking market was
in some turmoil. ABN Amro lost its international network due to the takeover by
Santander, RBS and Fortis. Moreover, after its failed takeover by Fortis it had to
be nationalized and is still in repair, so to say. ING, which also needed substantial
capital injections by the Dutch government is substantially downscaling its opera-
tions, especially abroad. Deutsche Bank has entered the Dutch market by buying
a large part of the corporate banking division of ABN Amro.
The short run effect of these developments was a strong increase in Rabobank’s
market shares for retail savings (due to a flight to quality) and mortgages (due to
capital constraints at the other banks). In the longer run, however, this may trans-
late into a much fiercer competition in the home market.
The operations in their home market of Rabobank and other cooperative banks
are largely based on traditional banking. Their business model is not based on
selling by securitization of commoditized credits (OTD, “originate to distribute”)
but, with the aim of responding to the needs of their members/customers, it is
based on a more traditional “intermediation role” along the OTH (“originate to
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hold”) model. As a consequence, co-operative banks remain committed to the
real economy, and they can play an important role in the recovery process after
the crisis. However, in the international operations, the operations of Rabobank
and its cooperative peers more reflect the business model of commercial banks. It
is here that their losses have been concentrated (see below).
The international strategy of Rabobank has seen several changes over the years.
Initially, the international network was seen as an essential element in the support
of internationally operating Dutch companies. But the international activities were
completely subordinate to the domestic activities. The only field where Rabobank
saw a major international niche for itself was in the field of International Food-
and Agri banking. This is seen as a logical development from its domestic roots in
agriculture, where Rabobank even today holds market shares of around 85% in
the Dutch market. Gradually, the bank’s international ambitions grew wider, cul-
minating in a major move into investment banking at the end of the 1990s. In this
aspect, Rabobank followed many other banks with similar ambitions. However,
as it soon appeared that the promises of investment banking would not be fulfilled,
Rabobank quickly scaled down these operations in 1999. There were two motives
for this rather drastic step. First, although the income form investment banking
grew quickly, costs rose at the same pace. As a result, the contribution to net prof-
its was very disappointing. Second, and maybe even more important, the culture
of investment banking fitted badly with Rabobank’s company culture which is
deeply rooted in domestic retail banking (Vogelaar, 2009).
Another failed strategic move was the drive to create a pan-European cooperative
bank. The first step in this ambitious project was an attempted merger of
Rabobank Nederland with Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank (DG-Bank) in 1999,
the umbrella organization of the German cooperative system. This move was ill-
prepared and neglected the structural differences between, which is in many
aspects the very loosely organized German cooperative system and the rather
tightly organized Rabobank organization. After a short time this merger effort
was aborted at the end of 2000.
Today, Rabobank’s strategy can be summarized as follows:
1) stay a predominantly Dutch bank;
2) keep a strong cooperative identity;
3) retain creditworthiness at the highest (AAA) level;
4) further strengthening of all-finance market leadership in the Dutch market;
5) aim to be the world’s number 1 Food- and Agri bank;
6) maintain a high level of corporate social responsibility.
The financial target, aimed at maintaining the AAA rating, is of the utmost
importance. First a rating of the highest quality translates into low funding costs
and access to finance. Even in the current crisis, in which most banks were not
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able to attract funding without government guarantees, financial markets have
had a positive attitude towards issues by Rabobank. Second, to retain the AAA
rating it is absolutely necessary to pursue a rather conservative financial policy.
High solvency and a stable and healthy profit development are the absolute pre-
conditions for retaining this rating. One might say that the AAA rating and the
resulting necessary financial discipline to a certain extent are substitutes for the
market discipline that otherwise, if Rabobank was a quoted company, would
have been exerted by the financial markets.
However, maintaining a AAA rating is not without disadvantages, especially in
times when financial markets do not adequately translate differences in risk pro-
files into different funding costs. It is often said that for listed banks an AA rating
is better than the AAA of the Rabobank. To a certain extent this is true. If a bank’s
goal is to earn as much as it can for its shareholders, it will have to sail close to
the wind in terms of its risk profile. This entails much more volatile income
growth patterns. Major profit jumps can sometimes be followed by (sometimes
equally sharp) falls in income. Moreover, capital is used more intensively for risk-
bearing activities. In financial terms a bank like that makes more extensive use of
the leverage of core capital that is fairly limited compared to its activities. On the
one hand, this leverage of capital facilitates a clearly higher return on equity than
for banks that opt for an extra capital buffer. On the other hand, this type of
buffer makes more conservative banks like Rabobank much less vulnerable to
unexpected adversity and provides scope for growth if specific opportunities
arise.
As a result, the advantages and drawbacks of the AAA rating were discussed
within Rabobank in the period before the credit crisis. Since, within Rabobank,
not all were convinced of the usefulness of a top rating, there was some pressure
to abandon the rating ambitions. However, the credit crisis proved beyond any
doubt how important that top rating is for a bank. It was mainly its rating that
gave Rabobank continued access to the financial markets even during the finan-
cial crisis. It also became clear how wise it had been for the bank not to pursue
an extension of its capital leverage, as the continued stretching of leverage by
financial institutions and within financial products proved to be one of the chief
causes of the woes that were given the name credit crisis.
3.2. RABOBANK AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS4
How did Rabobank fare in the turbulent circumstances of the current crisis? As
already stated at the start of this contribution, Rabobank is primarily a tradi-
tional bank, with lending and savings and other funds entrusted as main items on
4 This paragraph draws heavily on VOGELAAR (2009).
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the balance sheet. Around one quarter of the bank’s income comes from
Rabobank International, the wholesale business (which includes its international
retail operation). Within this entity, investments in the form of structured credit
products were developed and/or traded on a relatively modest scale. It has already
been mentioned how the original plans to create an investment bank division
within the Rabobank had been abandoned at the end of the nineties. In the fol-
lowing period, around the turn of the century, solvency proved to be becoming
an increasingly scarce asset. Rabobank also experienced limits in its opportunities
for growth. In itself that is not bad, but a natural inclination arose to stretch the
limits where possible. Securitization was a suitable means to achieve this. This
was done in a traditional way, with own lending and (facilitating) loans from
customers. But in addition, Rabobank also acquired assets in the form of struc-
tured credits with short-term financing via separate investment vehicles. This pro-
duced attractive yields, without reducing the bank’s solvency. Because the bank
supported these investment vehicles it was also exposed to risks as a co-investor.
When in 2007 and 2008 investors stayed away because they no longer trusted the
assets in these types of funds, Rabobank had to step in itself. Consequently, the
bank’s investment portfolio (which the bank maintains in order to be able to
generate liquidity rapidly if necessary) partly consisted of structured investments.
Although the great majority of these carried a AAA rating, once the crisis broke
out this rating had less meaning than had originally been thought. In addition, the
credit risk had been hedged for a part of the portfolio, chiefly with a view to the
advantages this provided in terms of solvency. But such hedges at monoline insur-
ance companies also proved to provide less security than originally intended.
Figure 4: Growth in net profit of Rabobank in 25-year period (in € million)
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All in all, the consequence for Rabobank (specifically, Rabobank International)
was certainly not that it had direct loans in (US) subprime mortgages, but that it
did have an indirect position via its investment portfolio in the form of structured
products, particularly RMBS and CDOs4.
Rabobank eliminated the risk-bearing elements in its investment portfolio as
quickly and extensively as possible. At year-end 2008 the “exposure” to indirect
positions on subprime mortgages was reduced to only € 158 million. Meanwhile
in 2007 and 2008 € 1.7 billion after tax had been written off through the profit
and loss account on positions in the banking operations that had been impacted
by the financial crisis. The results at the other Rabobank units, the local member
banks in particular, proved sufficient to set off the above-mentioned losses, and
therefore in 2007 and the first six months of 2008 the bank achieved its net profit
target of at least 12 percent growth. For 2008 as a whole the bank reported profit
growth of 2 percent, whereas many other banks throughout the world had to
report substantial losses or at least sharp falls in profit. Rabobank’s relatively
stable profits are to a significant extent due to the diversity of its activities, and
also to its conservative accounting practices. Unlike shareholder-driven banks, a
cooperative bank is not aiming to achieve the maximum attainable result every
quarter. In tandem with a basically limited risk profile this leads, in practice, to
flatter changes in results, compared to significant volatility at listed banks.
The Tier 1 ratio (the ratio of equity to risk-weighted lending) was still comforta-
bly above 10 percent and, applying the new calculation method (“Basel II”) at
12.7 percent, in line with the upwardly revised target of at least 12.5 percent. The
cooperative Rabobank thus never opted to strive to extend its capital leverage to
the maximum. Quite the contrary, the substantial buffer is intended for tougher
times and the fact that it remained unutilized even in the tough times of the credit
crisis is a sign of the bank’s strength.
However, for a bank that in its Mission Statement gives the creation of customer
value the highest priority, there is a question about which values the bank created
when it ventured into the complex and risky world of structured credit products
in the years before the crisis erupted. In the end this question has to be answered
with the conclusion that customer interests were not the primary objective in
doing so, but that “profit as an end in itself” was being pursued. In this case, the
bank was acting not in its traditional role of intermediary but urgently seeking a
yield pick-up at a supposedly acceptable risk level. This did not end well and was
also, ultimately, alien to the co-operative culture. Once this was concluded, it was
decided that the wholesale business should from now on again target customer-
focused activities. The bank is also again acting primarily as an intermediary in
the financial markets, as trader, between the money and capital market flows.
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To summarize, Rabobank’s experiences during the current crisis can be subdi-
vided into several stages. In the years before the crisis broke out, (the first stage)
Rabobank experienced strong growth of its international activities. Part of this
growth was not client driven, but can be characterized as purely profit driven.
This growth also resulted in a strong increase in its dependence on wholesale
funding via the financial markets. During this period financial markets seriously
under-priced risk. For Rabobank this meant an extra challenge, as its funding
advantage was undermined by this development. Especially in its international
business, the bank gradually lost its client focus and started to behave more and
more like a commercial bank. However, the core of its strategy, its domestic busi-
ness, remained on course. The second stage, as described above, showed substan-
tial losses on exposures to the US market, in spite of the highest rating of the
products in its portfolio. The bank aggressively took its loss and strongly reori-
ented its international business. Thanks to its good diversification of activities
and its very strong performance in its home market, the bank nevertheless
reported a record net profit over 2008.
The third stage, however, appears to be the most difficult. The Dutch economy
turned into a deep recession in 2009, with a decline in real GDP of approximately
4%. Rabobank, deeply involved in the Dutch economy, suffered strongly from
the deterioration in the economic environment. It has had to take large bad loan
provisions on its corporate loan portfolio. This is in contrast to its mortgage port-
folio, which is still performing extremely well with loan losses of less than 2 pro
mille (0.02%) of total mortgage lending. The good performance of Rabobank’s
mortgage portfolio illustrates that in the Netherlands, unlike in a number of other
countries, the market for mortgage loans (and the underlying residential housing
market) is fundamentally sound. In addition, the bank has suffered serious losses
in Ireland. A second problem for Rabobank is that deposit savings rates in the
Netherlands are relatively high. This has to do with the fact that some State sup-
ported banks are trying to buy back market share in the savings market. This
follows their heavy losses in market share suffered in the run-up to the failure of
Fortis/ABN Amro in October 2008. In contrast to several other countries, where
the authorities actively intervened to prevent distortions in competition due to
State support to banks, the Dutch authorities have so far stayed on the sidelines.
Moreover, the Dutch Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS) is rather attractive for
high risk banks, in many cases from foreign origin, to attract savings under cover
of its guarantee. The case of Icesave, a branch of Icelandic bank Landsbanki, that
failed in October 2008 is a good example of the way the Dutch DGS is open to
abuse (Groeneveld, 2009). The result of all this is a high deposit savings rate
which has reduced the profit margins of banks. This is hurting the banks that
have survived the crisis without government support, as they struggle to stay
profitable in a rather hostile environment. For Rabobank this means that its net
SUERF2010_3.book  Page 43  Thursday, June 17, 2010  12:09 PM44 THE QUEST FOR STABILITY: THE VIEW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
larcier
profits over 2009 will be significantly lower than its 2008 record profits. This is
the first year in its existence in which Rabobank will record a decline in profits5.
However, the crisis has also brought advantages to Rabobank. Its market share
in savings deposits increased substantially in 2007 and especially in 2008, when
consumers more and more appreciated Rabobank’s low risk profile. In the finan-
cial markets, Rabobank’s strong performance was recognized by investors world-
wide. This was illustrated by the fact that Rabobank was the first bank to launch
a major bond issue, without government guarantee, in January 2009. It succeeded
to raise € 5 billion in only a couple of hours. Without exaggeration, it can be said
that this issue heralded the revival of the world’s financial markets’ appetite for
good quality bonds. Moreover, although Rabobank today has to pay a higher
price for its long-term funding than it had in the past, its advantage over its lower-
rated competitors has substantially increased.
3.2.1. Rabobank in the crisis: a summary
All in all, Rabobank dealt relatively well with this crisis. It is still comfortably
profitable, its capital ratios stayed intact by a wide margin and its domestic mar-
ket shares have increased substantially. At the height of the liquidity crisis,
Rabobank almost drowned in a fresh inflow of liquidity, which in these times is
a remarkable position. This reflects the confidence that others clients, banks and
authorities have in the bank. The fact that it is not listed on the stock exchange
also helped, as it kept the bank out of the turbulence at the stock exchanges in
2008. The explicit decision, made in 1998, not to go for a listing appeared to be
a very wise one. Today, its standing in international financial markets is better
than ever, its AAA rating was reconfirmed by both Moody’s and Standard and
Poor’s in the summer of 2009 and it ranks in the global top 20 of large banks
(ranked by equity)6. The first conclusion could be that it is a solid and successful
bank with a basically sound business model.
However, Rabobank’s management draw some other conclusions as well. First, it
was clear that the bank’s losses were due to a loss of focus in its international
business and that this should be repaired. A strong refocusing of Rabobank Inter-
national towards more client based business was the result. Moreover, as the
growth rate of lending and other assets structurally exceeded the growth in sav-
ings deposits, Rabobank increasingly turned to the financial markets for long
5 Rabobank’s profits are also hurt by the fact that the Dutch DGS is an ex-post system, in which the surviving
banks pay the costs of failures of other banks. After the Icesave debacle, which cost Rabobank over
€ 30 million, it will also have to pay for the failure of DSB Bank in 2009. The costs of this failure are unknown
so far, but ultimately the could increase to several hundreds of million euros.
6 Note, however, that both Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s have added a negative rating outlook to the rating.
However, Rabobank has experienced a negative outlook to its rating before, but succeeded to get this removed
by improving its performance. It is strongly committed to retaining the highest credit rating.
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term funding. Although it was (and still is) very successful in this respect helped
by its AAA rating, it was concluded that the growth of its activities was too high.
Extrapolating its growth rate of the last decade it was feared that Rabobank
would become too dependent on long term wholesale funding. This fear was fur-
ther fuelled when, in the last months of 2008 when financial markets closed down
almost completely for all non-government issuers, Rabobank also encountered
for a short period problems in finding long term professional funding. In January
2009, when this ban was broken, there was huge delight within Rabobank. It was
foreseen that 2009 would be a difficult year for attracting long tem funding, but
as it turned out Rabobank met its funding target for 2009 as early as the middle
of the year. Nevertheless, it was concluded that the balance sheet growth should
be substantially reduced. These conclusions had already been drawn in the sum-
mer of 2008 and were immediately implemented, which will result in a more or
less stable balance sheet total over 2009. In particular, the activities of the Global
Financial Markets directorate of Rabobank International were scaled down sub-
stantially.
As can be learned from its experience, Rabobank is in many aspects a “normal”
bank. Mistakes made by other banks were made by Rabobank as well. It could
not withstand the temptations of investment banking. It was tempted into a Euro-
pean adventure that turned out to be a dead end. And it has been involved in
securitization activities that were not client focused but were completely aimed at
a yield pick-up. Especially in its international operations, Rabobank from time to
time wandered from its core business of retail banking.
There are also some strong differences compared with other banks. First, its core
strategy, aimed at retail banking in the Netherlands, remained stable over the
decades. Second, it has a strong company culture, deeply rooted in its cooperative
retail banking background. Once the international operations wandered too far
off from its core business, whether that be in effectiveness or in culture, resistance
from the local banks quickly mounted. Third, the governance of Rabobank is
organized in a democratic way that makes it possible for the local banks to pull
the strings on the central organization, including Rabobank International7.
Fourth, the strategy to keep the AAA rating at all costs has a strong disciplinary
effect on the bank’s behavior. The result of all this is that, once parts of the
Rabobank Group make seriously wrong decisions, the countervailing powers
guaranteed quick and effective reversals. Finally, its strong balance sheet, also a
direct result of it AAA rating, made it possible to survive last year’s event without
serious damage.
7 It is the strong governance in which Rabobank differs significantly from other banks, such as ABN Amro. For
years, ABN Amro was rather volatile in its overall strategy and kept on investing in its investment banking arm,
long after it was clear that it was not a successful strategy. Weak governance finished ABN Amro as a major
player (SMIT (2008)).
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Rabobank’s key success factor is not better banking than its peers, but can be
summarized as a better governance structure in combination with a strong com-
pany culture and a deeply ingrained conservative attitude towards banking.
3.3. COOPERATIVE BANKS AND THEIR SYSTEMIC IMPACT
In this paragraph we will broaden the topic and discuss the question whether the
experience of Rabobank has been a unique event or whether cooperative banks
in general fared better during this crisis. Before answering this question, we will
start by discussing the systemic impact of cooperative banks.
Cooperative banks themselves feel that they have a positive impact on the finan-
cial system. They often state that the presence of a strong cooperative banking
group has a disciplinary effect on the behavior of other suppliers of financial
services. This feeling goes back directly to their roots as local credit cooperatives,
established in reaction of the market failures that were present at the end of the
19th century. Cooperative banks prefer to see themselves as “customer cham-
pions” (Oliver Wyman, 2008). Their presence adds to competition in the finan-
cial sector, preventing commercial banks to maximize their profits to the disad-
vantage of their clients. The so-called “presence value” of cooperative banks
translate into better deals for their clients, as they do not aim at profit maximiza-
tion. Other banks have to follow, because otherwise they will lose substantial
market shares to the cooperative banks. The problem with this claim is that it is
difficult to demonstrate this with precise empirical research as the impact of a
strong cooperative group on the behavior on other financial services suppliers is
very difficult to quantify: the standard “counter-factual” problem. The best
observations can either be obtained when cooperative groups are established or,
alternatively, when they have disappeared from the market. Although most eco-
nomic history books indeed are rather positive on the economic contributions by
cooperative organizations – not necessarily banks alone –, hard data are difficult
to be found. Moreover, cooperative banks primarily filled the gaps that were left
by the other banks, that in many European countries were only present in the
countryside at the time. And although most observers agree that the arrival of
credit cooperatives substantially improved access to finance against good condi-
tions for farmers and craftsmen, one can of course object that commercial banks
in a competitive environment could have done the same job. There also are few
examples available of disappearing cooperative banking groups and the conse-
quences of their absence on the financial system in which they operated. The only
clear case at hand is the substantial decline in the power of mutual building soci-
eties in the UK during the 1990s when many of the largest societies converted to
shareholder value status and became commercial banks. This has led to a
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decrease in competition and to a less stable financial system (Llewellyn, 2008,
2009).
The cooperative claim is not undisputed, however. In 2003, PA Consultants pub-
lished a paper with the challenging title Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), in
which they stated that the presence of cooperative banks put a strong downward
pressure on profit margins in the financial industry. The result, according to the
authors, is underperformance of banks and in the end financial instability. At
least on one point PA consultants appear to agree with the cooperative banks
themselves : both claim that the presence of cooperative banks exerts a down-
ward pressure on profit margins in the financial services industry. However,
whereas the cooperative banks claim that this is a beneficial development for the
clients, PA Consultants emphasize the negative effect for the efficiency of the
financial sector and the stability of the financial system as a whole.
History shows that cooperative banks can be very crisis-proof. The case in favor
of the positive contribution of cooperative banks is much broader that Rabobank
alone. As illustrated by Groeneveld & De Vries (2009), the European cooperative
banking sector on average did much better during this crisis , than the average
commercial bank. The same conclusion, however, was also drawn by Ayadi et al.
(2009) for the European savings banking sector, which adds weight to the argu-
ment that for the stability of the financial sector as a whole it is a good thing to
have banks with different orientations and ownership structures.
Historical research by Mooij (2009) on the Dutch financial crisis of the 1930s
arrived at the same conclusion. In the first half of that decade, which was a time
of severe economic problems, a total of more than 100 commercial banks disap-
peared. Of this total, 17 went bankrupt, 58 had to liquidate their business and
the rest were taken over by, or merged with, other banks. In contrast, only 2
cooperative banks ran into problems and were forced to merge with stronger
banks from the same group8. No client ever noticed there were any problems.
What are the reasons of the good cooperative performance in times of crisis?
During the crisis of the 1930s, cooperative banks were still relatively undercapi-
talized when compared to commercial banks. Their capital ratios were relatively
low and their commercial margins were small. Compared with their commercial
counterparts they looked relatively vulnerable. Therefore, their performance dur-
ing that crisis came as something of a surprise. Looking back, one can conclude
that the cooperatives’ claim that the quality of their loans was better than that of
other banks was correct. In the core, the business of local credit cooperatives
comes down to enabling entrepreneurs to borrow the savings of their neighbor(s).
8 Before 1972, two cooperative banking groups were active, viz. the Raiffeisen Bank and the Boerenleenbank
(Farmers Lending bank). In addition, there was a small number of credit cooperatives active that were not part
of one of these groups. There are no data available about their fate.
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This translated in a conservative lending policy, some reluctance by borrowers to
go deeply into debt, and very high standards in debt servicing. Peer pressure was
high and effective, as people hate to fail their neighbors. On the other hand, sav-
ers had confidence that their money was safe, knowing to whom it was lent. It is
the discipline of a well-organized microfinance institution that helped the Dutch
cooperative banking sector through the first serious financial crisis it had to face.
In today’s crisis the situation is rather different. On the one hand group peer
pressures, although still present, have lost in strength, as most cooperative banks
have evolved in their operations akin to commercial banks. On the other hand,
cooperative banks still have their conservative attitude towards banking. This
translates into a strong emphasis in their activities towards traditional retail
banking. Moreover, their balance sheets are relatively strong when compared to
commercial banks. This is illustrated in the next table in which the average per-
formance of the most important European cooperative banks is compared with a
series of large peers. It shows that cooperative banks on average have relatively
high capital ratios. As a consequence of the lower leverage, their financial per-
formance is slightly worse than that of commercial banks, although on the aver-
age cooperative profits appear more stable.
Table 3: Financial performance of cooperative and commercial banks compared, 
2002-2007
Source: Groeneveld and De Vries (2009)
Note: N= the number of banks, O= the total number of observations. The sample consists of large banks (balance
sheet total exceeding € 50 billion)in seven countries, viz. Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, The Netherland, The
United Kingdom and Switzerland. Note that two of those countries, viz Belgium and the UK, are the home of large
commercial banks, but do not have a substantial cooperative banking sector . The columns in the table show aver-
ages, standard deviations are between brackets. 
Another striking feature from this table is that it shows that in efficiency, as meas-
ured by the cost to income ratio, the differences between commercial and coop-
erative banks are very small. This is in contrast to the view that the absence of
shareholder pressures tends to make non-listed banks less efficient than quoted
companies. Moreover, efficiency ratios of cooperative banks are more stable than
those of their competitors and have been structurally improving. As a result, at
the end of the period in many European countries they actually operated more
efficient than their commercial peers.
Cooperative Banks Commercial Banks
(N=9/O=53) (N=36/O=159)
ROE 9.3 (4.5) 13.4 (8.5)
ROA 0.4 (0.2) 0.5 (0.3)
Core Capital 4.7 (1.4) 3.6 (1.4)
Tier-1 Capital 9.2 (1.4) 8.4 (1.4)
Cost/income ratio 62 (6.7) 61 (13.3)
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Figure 5: Cost/income ratio of co-operative banks (2002-2007)
Source: Rabobank (2009)
Note: The calculations cover Germany, France, Austria, the Netherlands and Switzerland.
A more comprehensive measure of financial stability is the so-called Z-score. This
score is calculated as Z = (ROA + E/A)/ (σ(ROA)), in which ROA is return on
assets, E = core capital, A = total assets and (σ (ROA) = standard deviation of
ROA. This indicator can be interpreted as the “distance to bankruptcy”: the
higher the score, the more stable the bank.
Table 4 shows the results of a comparison between commercial and cooperative
banks over the period 2002-2007 (both the Z-score and its components). It illus-
trates that, as a group, cooperative banks are more stable than their commercial
counterparts, in any individual year of the period. Moreover, whereas the average
Z-score of commercial banks show a gradual but steady decline over the period,
cooperative banks’ scores are more or less stable.
Table 4: Z-scores and their components
Source: Groeneveld and De Vries (2009)
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Groeneveld and De Vries also investigated whether the results of table 4 also
holds when broken down to national levels. This is shown in table 5. Note that
this comparison is limited to only five countries, as the United Kingdom and Bel-
gium do not have a significant cooperative banking sector left.
Table 5: international comparison of Z-scores
Source: Groeneveld and De Vries (2009)
In four of the five countries it appears that the cooperative banks score signifi-
cantly higher with their Z-scores than commercial banks. France is the exception
to this rule. The relatively low score of the French cooperatives can possibly be
explained by the takeover of commercial bank Credit Lyonnais by cooperative
giant Credit Agricole. Moreover, it is possible that Credit Agricole, one of the few
cooperative banks to be listed on the stock exchange, has more characteristics of
a commercial bank than its cooperative peers. However, Groeneveld and De Vries
offer no explanation for the extremely high Z-score of the French commercial
banks, both in comparison to the French cooperatives and compared to their
foreign competitors.
3.4. COOPERATIVE BANKS’ PERFORMANCE IN THE CURRENT 
CRISIS9
During the recent crisis, we have observed the failure of a large number of finan-
cial institutions. In general the financial institutions that have failed were com-
mercial banks and public savings banking groups’ central banks (Landesbanken
in Germany) or former cooperative groups that choose to demutualise, such as
Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley in the UK. On the contrary, apart from
UK’s minor Dunfermline Building Society, no European co-operative bank has
failed during this crisis.
Co-operative banks were certainly not immune for the current crisis. Like many
commercial banks, many of the large co-operative banks have suffered substan-








A u s t r i a 1 58 24 8
G e r m a n y 2 58 03 3
France 115 41 62
The Netherlands 40 108 57
Switzerland 13 97 34
9 This paragraph is based on EACB (2010).
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less severely by the direct effects of the crisis than private and investment banks.
Their losses and write-downs appear to be relatively moderate and mainly con-
centrated in their international activities. This illustrates that in their interna-
tional business cooperative banks operate more or less identically to commercial
banks. Besides, no co-operative bank has fallen under nationalisation pro-
grammes nor has been declared bankrupt. As discussed earlier, co-operative
banks are predominantly domestically and retail orientated. As such, they have
on average better knowledge about the risks in their business than do other play-
ers. This does not mean, however, that they are immune: as part of the system
they are also affected by the economic downturn because many of their retail and
wholesale clients are hit by the recession. As illustrated above by the case of
Rabobank, for cooperative banks the impact of the recession may be larger than
the losses of the financial crisis as such. This is not surprising as with very strong
ties in local economies, co-operative banks are affected by any turbulence at local
level.
However at least four characteristics set co-operative banks apart from other
banks:
– they are generally well capitalised (see above).
– they apply a distinctive business model in banking that puts the members and
customers at its heart, with a long-term perspective through good and bad
times;
– they have built-in anti-cyclical behaviour and internal deposit guarantee
schemes (such as Rabobank’s far more extensive cross guarantee scheme).
– they have tight bottom up control mechanisms.
When looking more closely at the direct costs of the crisis, similar conclusions can
be drawn:
– more than 95% of write downs registered worldwide were due to commercial
banks and some public banks; the cost in terms of loan loss provisions seems
more equally distributed;
– recapitalization (in particular state aids) was also massively directed towards
commercial banks and some public banks;
– co-operative banks share of the direct costs of the crisis is much smaller than
their weight in the economy, with about 20% in terms of deposits market
share.
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Figure 6: Global cost of the crisis to date ($ Bn)
Source: Bloomberg
Note: losses taken via the profit and loss account
There are a number of explanations for the lower fragility of cooperative banks.
The corporate governance structure plays an important role. Member ownership
entails a conservative banking approach with a longer term perspective and a
focus on retail banking. This banking area is characterised by relatively lower
risks, lower volatility and more stable returns. Although cooperative banks have
naturally expanded the scope of their activities in recent years by moving into
cross-border markets and rolling out new services, their activities are relatively
strongly concentrated in their domestic markets. As far as cooperative banks suf-
fered losses during the financial crisis these were overwhelmingly concentrated in
their international business, either in investment banking operations or in foreign
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banking networks. The further they move away from their domestic market, the
more vulnerable cooperatives become.
3.5. CONCLUSION
This contribution is written at the end of 2009. As we write, it becomes more and
more clear that the world economy is slowly recovering. Stock exchanges have
recovered large parts of their post-Lehman losses and gradually the financial
world is turning to business as usual.
Or is it really? Although the investment bankers of Goldman Sachs, already more
profitable as ever before, appear to forget that they also needed government sup-
port in 2008, many people in the rest of the world have better memories. The
world’s financial system has escaped the most important and dangerous financial
crisis for centuries, and the economic damage is being felt day by day by people
who have lost their jobs or see their future tax bill increase. As a result, there are
many voices that the financial system should be drastically reformed to prevent
crises such as these to reoccur. However, some instability and crisis-proneness is
inherent in the capitalist system, which is a logical result of its underlying dyna-
mism. Moreover, given the long term performance of the capitalist system when
it comes to creating wealth, it is clear that although the financial system needs
some reform, it does not make sense to go back to the world of huge state inter-
ventionism. The most stable economy in the world, after all, is North Korea, and
no sensible human being would like to live there.
This having said, it is clear that some aspects of finance will change. The under-
lying trends and market forces will remain the same as before, however
(Llewellyn, 1999). Changes in banking may be expected in the field of supervi-
sion. Supervision will be broadened, for example by including the shadow bank-
ing system (special investment vehicles), and also improved. In Europe, there will
be more supervision on an Europe-wide basis, and cooperation between global
supervisors will be intensified. So called “too big to fail” institutions will be
scaled down or reorganized in such a way that they can easily be broken up with-
out substantial collateral damage, as they turned out to be “too big to save” as
well. Some large banks almost brought down the governments that came to their
rescue. One could even say that some of them were more or less saved by the euro.
Otherwise, countries like Ireland and The Netherlands, that had to conduct huge
rescue operations, would have run into much more serious trouble on maybe even
an Icelandic scale. Payment structures in the financial industry will be reformed
to remove perverse incentives. Deposit guarantee schemes will be harmonized and
reformed (Groeneveld, 2009). And the role of short-term shareholder activism
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will certainly be discussed, as shareholders played an important role in the devel-
opments that drove the financial system to the brink of collapse.
Against this background, one would expect a strong increase in interest in finan-
cial institutions that are organized in a different way. In this crisis, both cooper-
ative and savings banks appeared to be more stable than shareholder value driven
commercial banks. It is surprising that, for example, in the position paper of the
Dutch government on the future of banking no reference was made to the poten-
tially positive role of savings and cooperative banks for the stability of the finan-
cial system. This reflects that policy makers completely fail to understand that
banks like Rabobank are based on a fundamentally different business model. This
can be blamed on the fact that the cooperative business model, that until the
1970s was widely discussed in the economic text books, has disappeared from the
academic literature (Kalmi, 2007). Generations of students have been educated
with profit maximization and shareholder value, although at least in Europe the
largest (and as it appeared the most stable) part of retail banking is organized on
a different paradigm. Only recently the value of cooperative banking and its
underlying multiple bottom line approach has made a modest come back’ in the
literature (Fonteyne (2007), Mooij and Boonstra (2009), Llewellyn (2009)).
This is not to say that the cooperative banking model is superior to its commercial
rival. The aggressive drive from commercial banks in their aim at maximum prof-
its and their financial innovations have driven competition and created substan-
tial wealth. It is the added value of having, to quote Llewellyn (2009), “biodiver-
sity in banking”, that makes the system both innovative and stable. However,
once they have disappeared form the system, it is very difficult if not impossible
to reintroduce cooperative banks. It may be possible to establish new savings
banks, but for cooperative banks this may be a bridge too far. The governance
model may be copied, just as their decentralized structure and conservative
behavior. But who is going to capitalize them? Is, for example, the British govern-
ment prepared to abstain from its claim on all the tax money it has put into
Northern Rock in order to recapitalize this banks? Would the taxpayer under-
stand and accept that the government gives away billions of Sterling to a failed
formerly mutual bank, so that it again can “own itself”? Just because of the
importance of the biodiversity of the financial system? I really doubt it.
But, as the case of Rabobank illustrates, above all it is company culture that mat-
ters. And cultures can be mimicked, but not be copied, They are not created, they
grow over the decades.
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4. MONITORING BANKING SECTOR RISKS: 
AN APPLIED APPROACH1
Veronica Vallés & Christian Weistroffer
Abstract
Despite abundant empirical evidence on the merits and limits of early-warning
systems for banking crises the day-to-day use of such systems seems to be limited.
Reluctance to use such systems may partly be explained by the difficulties to oper-
ationalise the proposed models, which are often demanding in terms of data
requirements and/ or methodologies.
We try to overcome these difficulties and show how an early-warning system can
be implemented in practice. Drawing on existing empirical work, we develop a
model that provides timely and readily digestible information on macroeconomic
developments, e.g. booming credit volumes, excessively rising asset prices or
exchange rates, which in the past typically preceded banking crises. Our model is
tailored to meet the professional needs of an internationally operating private
sector financial institution and can be applied across a wide range of industrial
countries and emerging markets.
Keywords: banking crisis, early-warning system, credit risk management
JEL Classification: E44, F37, G21
4.1. INTRODUCTION
Large scale banking sector problems are a persistent threat to both advanced and
developing financial systems. Previous efforts to prevent systemic banking sector
problems at national and international levels have had limited success. Evidence
from Bordo et al. (2001) suggests that with the liberalisation and deregulation of
markets the crisis problem has not grown less severe – neither in terms of eco-
nomic cost or frequency of crises. The latest credit crises in the US and Europe are
another case in point.
Consequently, national supervisors, central banks and international institutions
such as the BIS, IMF or World Bank all strive to prevent crises or at least to
1 This paper draws on a project conducted by DB Research, the think tank of Deutsche Bank AG. However, the
paper presents the authors’ personal opinions and does not necessarily reflect the views of Deutsche Bank AG
or its staff. We are especially indebted to Bernhard Speyer, Maria Laura Lanzeni and Franz Stevens for inspiring
discussions and enduring support. Also, we would like to thank Jennifer Asuncion who contributed extensively
to the development of the model in this paper. We thank Dieter Held and Thomas Damer who provided excel-
lent technical support as well as Christian Link and Lilli Bialluch for outstanding research assistance. We are
particularly grateful to Michael Frenkel and Stefan Bergheim for valuable comments. Any errors or omissions
are, of course, our own.
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identify banking sector risks before they materialise. Internationally operating
private sector financial institutions likewise have an innate interest to monitor
banking sector risks, as they are exposed to credit and market risk across a broad
range of countries. For such institutions, it is worthwhile to consider the similar-
ities and reoccurring patterns across crises in different countries and times and
using them for internal risk assessment. In fact, evidence from the past two dec-
ades and before suggests that banking crises were often linked to financial cycles
and thus to some extent foreseeable. Typically, a simultaneous boom in lending
and asset prices, followed by a sharp decline, could frequently be observed prior
to a crisis. An appreciating exchange rate, accompanied by deteriorating trade
competitiveness and subsequent capital flight, has played a major role in many
emerging markets too. Most prominent examples include the 1997/98 Asian cri-
sis, the Japanese experience since the early 1990s, and the experiences of the Nor-
dic countries during the late 1980s and early 1990s. More recently, Russia
(1998), Ecuador (1999) and Argentina (2001) but also the US (2007) experienced
crises that followed similar patterns.
Combining the methodologies used by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Kaminsky
(1999) and Borio and Lowe (2002a, 2002b, 2004) we develop a new early-warn-
ing system that aims at detecting the above-described economic patterns in time.
In doing so, we differentiate between emerging markets and industrial countries.
For the emerging markets we develop a model based on three indicators, i.e.
domestic credit to GDP, the real effective exchange rate and equity prices. For the
industrial countries we combine measures of housing and equity prices, domestic
credit to GDP and economic output. Indicators are calculated as percentage devi-
ations from their longer-term trends. Our aim is to capture adverse macroeco-
nomic and financial developments that have led to banking sector problems in the
past. Ideally, our model can be deployed to serve as a timely snapshot on macr-
oeconomic banking sector risks across a wide range of industrial countries and
emerging markets. However, the analysis needs to be complemented by a micro-
prudential perspective on banking sector risks, which should include a thorough
assessment of the resilience of banks to common or idiosyncratic shocks as well
as to contagion risk.
Complementing previous studies in this field, we focus on the requirements and
obstacles that researchers face when designing, implementing and up-dating an
early warning system in day-to-day business. We describe the methodology in
some detail and present evidence for a broad sample of industrial countries and
emerging market countries, respectively.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 4.2. asks why a pri-
vate sector financial institution should care about monitoring banking sector
risks. Section 4.3. elaborates on the specific (technical) requirements when
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designing a model for day-to-day use. Section 4.4. provides information on the
methodological background and describes our approach. Section 4.5. presents
further details on the implementation of the model, each with the emerging mar-
kets and the industrial countries. Section 4.6. concludes.
4.2. THE PRIVATE SECTOR’S CASE FOR AN EARLY-WARNING 
SYSTEM
Systemic banking crises are associated with sizable costs for the tax payer and the
overall economy. Fiscal and quasi-fiscal costs to rehabilitate banking systems
after crisis periods are calculated at 12.1% of GDP on average in developed coun-
tries and 17.6% of GDP in emerging market countries (Hoggarth et al. 2002).
Systemic banking crises have caused significant output losses, with estimates
ranging from 10.2% (IMF, 1998) to 20.7% (Hoggarth et al., 2002) in developed
countries and from 12.1% (IMF, 1998) to 13.9% (Hoggarth et al., 2002) in
medium-and low-income countries2.
The avoidance of major economic costs, stemming from problems in the banking
sector, rank high on the agenda of regulators and policy makers and receive
enhanced attention from the academic community3. But why does the private
sector have an interest in monitoring systemic banking sector risk? Simply,
because at the level of individual institutions systemic banking sector risk trans-
lates into business risk. In order to make sound strategic decisions regarding
credit risk and portfolio management the outlook on future banking sector risk
is of utmost relevance, both within the home market and in foreign markets.
To the extent that large international banks since the early 1990s have raised their
foreign exposures4 they face new challenges in monitoring country-specific credit
risk. Within the context of the implementation of Basel II, large international
banks have developed sophisticated internal sovereign risk rating systems. Given
the close link between systemic banking crises and sovereign risk these rating
systems encompass the assessment of national banking sectors as an integral part.
However, when it comes to the assessment of rare but extreme events, such as
banking crises, the private sector is often suspected of being short-sighted in its
judgement. There is a large body of literature that tries to rationalise fluctuations
in credit policies by pointing towards disaster myopia, herd behaviour, agency
2 The IMF (1998) measures output losses as the difference between the trend and the actual growth rate during
crisis periods, where the trend growth is calculated over a short three-year period before the crisis. HOGGARTH
et al. (2002) calculate output losses as the cumulative difference between the actual output level and its trend
over a ten-year period before the crisis.
3 For a survey of early-warning systems for banking crises see BELL and PAIN (2000) as well as DEMIRGÜC-KUNT
and DETRAGIACHE (2005). Other reviews can be found in ILLING and LIU (2003), EDISON (2004), KING,
NUXOLL and YEAGER (2004).
4 E.g. SCHILDBACH (2008) highlights the increasing participation of European banks abroad.
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problems and limited institutional memory5. From a macro perspective these
problems account for the so-called procyclicality of the financial system – that is
the provisioning of excess credit during economic boom phases followed by a
sharp contraction of credit during bust periods6.
The formulation and implementation of strategies to address these problems
poses a great challenge. First steps in that direction are the introduction of
through-the-cycle rating systems and the proposal of counter-cyclical capital
requirements rules. The use of early-warning systems for extreme but rare events,
which incorporate a longer-term perspective, can be another building block. Such
systems can help institutionalise the memory of an organisation with respect to
past crisis experience. They also offer a systematic approach for identifying pos-
sible turning points of the financial cycle at an early stage. While private sector
institutions certainly cannot prevent the regular emergence of financial cycles, at
least not by their isolated efforts, they can try to monitor cyclical macroeconomic
movements and be prepared for the emergence of possible banking sector prob-
lems.
To this end, the model presented in this paper tries to anticipate adverse macr-
oeconomic developments that eventually evolve into banking sector distress or
outright crisis. As part of a more comprehensive risk assessment programme it
needs to be a complemented by the analysis of other factors of systemic relevance
as well as the assessment of individual institutions (e.g. the institutional environ-
ment, interbank exposures and international links).
4.3. USER REQUIREMENTS
When implementing an early warning system for day-to-day use, the require-
ments of at least two target groups need to be taken into account. First, results
must be easily accessible and presented in a format that is straight-forward to
interpret by the end-user. Second, there should be easy-to-handle implementation
and updating procedures, which suit the requirements of the model developer.
For the end-user, the model should serve as a timely snapshot on potential bank-
ing sector risks. The user should be able to analyse the most recent information
on the macroeconomic variables and to compare them with evidence from past
crises. This should include the possibility of monitoring indicators individually
but also as a combined measure. Simple charts to contrast indicators with their
respective thresholds would be helpful to identify the main drivers of banking
sector vulnerabilities. In addition, the user should be allowed to monitor the orig-
inal time series that are used to calculate the signals, as this would provide a
5 See GUTTENTAG and HERRING (1984), HERRING (1999), JIMÉNEZ and SAURINA (2005).
6 See BORIO, FURFINE and LOWE (2001).
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useful cross-check of and more intuitive access to the underlying methodology.
Ideally, dynamic website implementation should allow straight-forward interpre-
tation of the model’s results (see appendix figures A-1 and A-2).
As to the specific needs of the developer, the model should be supportive to the
data management process, i.e. the frequent updating of input variables and the
recalibration of thresholds on a regular basis. The model should be implemented
in a dynamic framework that allows the developer to test alternative specifica-
tions. The developer should be able to compare results for different indicators,
forecast windows and alternative methodologies to build up individual and com-
posite indicators. Once the model is implemented, input time series to calculate
the indicators and signals should be automatically updated.
Without loss of generality, only a small number of input variables should be con-
sidered to keep the model as lean as possible. Also, the scope of the system in
terms of country coverage, data frequency and sample period should account for
possible data limitations. Consistent treatment of data errors and outliers should
be warranted. Finally, reproducible and robust calculation procedures need to be
at the core of the system in order to meet internal and external documentation
requirements. Documentation of the model should specify the main objectives,
definitions, assumptions and calculations. A clear description of the implementa-
tion processes and the rationale behind it would help ensure the system’s continu-
ity.
4.4. METHODOLOGICAL BACKGROUND AND MODEL DESIGN
In this and the following section, we develop an early-warning system that is
designed to meet the requirements postulated above and show how it can be
implemented in practice. We analyse two distinct datasets: One for the industrial
countries and one for the emerging markets. Separate analysis of industrial coun-
tries and emerging markets allows us to consider different regimes as regards the
selection of indicators, data frequency, forecast horizon and sample periods.
Despite both groups sharing common macroeconomic threats to banking sector
stability, i.e. excessive lending, booming equity or property prices, there is good
reason to analyse the two groups separately. First, data availability is a major
issue, as reliable time series of property prices for the emerging markets are hardly
available. Likewise, for some emerging markets equity price data has become
available only after the 1990s since national stock markets were not developed
before that time. Second, to the extent that the origins of banking crises vary
between the two sub-samples the separate consideration of emerging markets and
industrial countries allows us to tailor the set of indicators to the specific require-
ments of each group.
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While the different model specifications and results for the two sub-samples will
be presented in section 5, this section focuses on the common methodological
framework used in both sub-samples.
4.4.1. The signalling approach
Our model is based on the so-called signalling approach, which builds on a simple
idea: A single binary indicator is related to a binary crisis variable. In order to
trigger a signal the underlying indicator, e.g. domestic credit to GPD, must exceed
a predefined threshold. If a signal is preceding a crisis episode it is considered a
good signal, otherwise it is considered a false alarm. An indicator is said to have
good predictive power if it calls most of the crises while not producing too many
false alarms. Within this framework, individual indicators can be monitored on a
stand-alone basis but can also be combined to form a composite index.
While the signalling approach was originally developed to predict turning points
of business cycles7, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Kaminsky (1999) were
the first to adopt it to analyse early-warning signs of currency and banking crises.
More recently, Borio and Lowe (2002a, 2002b, 2004) applied a similar approach
to analyse the build-up of “financial imbalances” prior to banking crises. In con-
trast to these studies, Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, 1999) prefer using
a multivariate logit model in order to analyse early-warning signs of banking
crises. Although this approach is commonly used in the literature, no consensus
has been reached on whether one approach dominates the other8. Both the sig-
nalling approach and the qualitative response models such as logit or probit offer
unique advantages. On the one hand, multivariate qualitative response models
should generally outperform the more parsimonious signalling approach, as they
account for more than one indicator at a time and do not restrict the indicators’
variability to the discrete states of zero and one. On the other hand, the non-
parametric signalling approach holds the advantage of not relying on strict
assumptions on the variables’ distributional characteristics. Thereby, it avoids
one possible source of estimation error compared to the more sophisticated
regression models. In addition, the relatively simple calculation routine of the
signalling approach can be implemented without comprehensive training in com-
plex regression techniques. As mentioned above, each indicator can be easily fol-
lowed and interpreted on a stand-alone basis as well as within an index combin-
ing individual indicators. Finally, the concept of indicator thresholds allows the
model developer to explicitly weigh type-I errors (missed crises) against type-II
7 See STOCK and WATSON (1989), DIEBOLD and RUDEBUSCH (1989).
8 For a general discussion of different early-warning systems of banking crises see DEMIRGÜC-KUNT and DETRA-
GIACHE (2005). For a direct comparison of the multivariate logit and the signalling approach see DAVIS and
KARIM (2008).
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errors (false alarms). Thus, for our purpose of developing a straight-forward,
easy-to-interpret early-warning system we consider the benefits of the signalling
approach to outweigh those of the qualitative response models.
4.4.2. Defining past crisis dates
The careful identification and timing of in-sample crisis dates is one of the key
challenges in designing an early-warning system. To this end, two approaches can
be distinguished. One is based on the quantitative analyses of more or less high
frequency data (e.g. Von Hagen and Ho, 2007) the other is based on characteris-
tic crisis events9. Following the event-based approach, Demirgüc-Kunt and Detra-
giache (1998) identify a banking crisis if at least one of the following conditions
holds: The ratio of non-performing assets to total assets in the banking system
exceeded 10 percent; the cost of the rescue operation was at least two percent of
GDP; banking sector problems resulted in a large-scale nationalisation of banks.
Extensive bank runs took place or emergency measures such as deposit freezes,
prolonged bank holidays, or generalized deposit guarantees were obliged by the
government in response to the crisis. According to Caprio and Klingebiel (1996,
2003) a banking crisis is defined as a situation where much or all of the banking
systems’ capital is exhausted. Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996) distinguish
between (i) “significant extensive unsoundness short of crisis”, which are local-
ised crises or non-systemic episodes, and (ii) systemic banking crises, character-
ized by bank runs, collapsing financial firms or massive government intervention.
Admittedly, such dating schemes are more arbitrary in assigning crisis dates than
measures that relying solely on higher frequency data. However, to the extent that
high frequency indicators used to define crisis dates are tested for their ability to
predict the crisis, it will be difficult to identify the direction of causal effects.
Moreover, since high frequency quantitative indicators will merely cover the
symptoms of a crisis, a crisis will not be identified if it does not display the specific
symptoms. Conversely, a crisis will be assigned to those periods that displayed the
relevant symptoms regardless of whether there were systemic problems or not.
Because of such difficulties associated with purely quantitative measures, the lit-
erature predominantly uses the event-based identification schemes described
above. We do the same, combining and consolidating the different event-based
approaches. Thus, we consider events that qualify either as banking sector dis-
tress or as systemic crisis according to the following criteria:
(i) Banking sector distress is indicated by the failure of a number of institutions
within a short interval, or the failure of a single institution of systemic rele-
vance. Even in the absence of failures, an episode qualifies as banking sector
9 See JACOBS et al. (2005) for a review of different approaches to identify banking crises.
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distress if policy and regulatory actions to overcome strains in the banking
sector are taken. Such actions may be revealed by (de facto) forced takeovers
or mergers, or by the extension of public assistance (financial or otherwise)
to the banking sector;
(ii) an episode evolves into a systemic crisis if most or all of the system’s bank
capital is depleted. Widespread bank runs, large-scale failure of banks, or
massive public intervention to avoid systemic breakdown will be considered
as indications of a systemic crisis.
Note that our identification scheme also encompasses borderline events and
smaller episodes of systemic relevance. This deviates from the more commonly
followed approach in the literature to consider full-blown systemic crises only.
However, such a broad crisis definition allows us to analyse the industrial coun-
tries separately, as those countries experienced only four instances of large-scale
systemic crises during the past 25 years, i.e. the Nordic countries’ crises and the
Japanese crisis during the 1990s. Moreover, to the extent that banking sector
problems in modern financial systems do not emerge as full-blown systemic crises
– but rather display the symptoms that qualify for banking sector distress as
described above – they too will be captured by our crisis definition.
For the dating of systemic crises, we rely mainly on the studies by Caprio and
Klingebiel (2003) as well as Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996) who provide com-
prehensive and original research on historical crises dates. Further papers by Lae-
ven and Valencia (2008), the Bank for International Settlement (2004) as well as
our own estimates complement these sources.
4.4.3. Selecting indicators
In selecting early-warning indicators we closely follow Borio and Lowe (2002a,
2002b, 2004). The authors calculate indicator deviations (gaps) from their coun-
try-specific longer-term trend, i.e. credit gap, equity price gap, output gap and
exchange rate gap. They use a relatively long forecast horizon of one up to five
years prior to the crisis, trying to capture the “build-up of financial imbalances”
in the run-up to a crisis. Their results reflect recent international experience,
which highlights the role of financial cycles as a frequent cause for banking sector
problems. Typically, a simultaneous boom in asset prices and lending followed by
a sharp decline could be observed prior to a crisis. Historical evidence seems to
confirm the close link between property price cycles and banking sector prob-
lems, while the link with equity prices seems to be not as close10. In many cases,
financial liberalisation or (de facto) deregulation through financial innovation
10 See BIS (2001), BORIO and MCGUIRE (2004).
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have promoted the development of excessive lending which in turn fuelled rising
asset prices11.
Theory suggests that rising prices for equity or property during boom markets
may have a twofold effect on lending: On the one hand, rising asset prices tend
to stimulate economic activity, increasing the need for private sector financing.
On the other hand, higher prices raise the value of collateral, thereby reducing the
cost of borrowing. As a result, lending will be stimulated, which in turn fuels a
further rise in asset prices. Moreover, banks tend to underestimate credit risks
when prices are rising and economic conditions are rosy. In light of fierce compe-
tition, credit risk premia are squeezed and more risky projects receive financing.
When economic conditions are deteriorating, self-enforcing interaction between
lending and asset prices may be even more pronounced. As defaulting borrowers
are forced to sell their assets, prices decline. Collateral value diminishes, credit
costs increase, and credit supply is constrained. If credit is no longer available to
finance the purchase of assets, prices will decline further. Eventually, falling asset
prices, reduced collateral value, and defaulting borrowers will reinforce each
other, forcing banks to realise losses12.
An appreciating real effective exchange rate accompanied by deteriorating trade
competitiveness and capital flight may further contribute to crisis developments,
especially in the emerging markets. During the Asian financial crisis of 1997/98,
for instance, banking sector vulnerabilities arose from short-term foreign borrow-
ing and portfolio investment, which were used to finance long-term projects
(maturity mismatch). Formal or informal regimes of pegged exchange rates further
increased vulnerabilities by creating incentives to borrow in foreign currency,
while lending or investing in local currency (currency mismatch). During the boom
phase prior to crisis, lenders tended to underestimate credit risks, while borrowers
took the risk associated with foreign currency exposures too lightly. In the run-up
to the crisis, speculative inflows contributed to the overvaluation of national cur-
rencies in real terms. As a consequence, trade competitiveness declined, weighing
on exports and eventually leading to an economic slowdown. As soon as capital
flows started to reverse and asset prices fell, maturity and currency mismatches on
bank and corporate balance sheets led to a vicious circle: Collateral value declined
and borrowers were no longer able to repay their debt. At the same time, banks
experienced liquidity problems because they found it difficult to refinance them-
selves short-term or in foreign currency. Financial sector problems in turn under-
mined confidence in the stability of the currency, fuelling further capital flight and
eventually leading to the abandoning of the currency peg (twin crises)13.
11 REINHART and ROGOFF (2008).
12 See KINDLEBERGER (1996), KIYOTAKI and MOORE (1997), BIS (2001), BORIO and LOWE (2002a).
13 See KAMINSKY and REINHART (1999), GLICK and HUTCHISON (2001), EICHENGREEN and HAUSMANN (1999),
RADELET and SACHS (1998), HARDY and PAZARBASIOGLU (1998).
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Exploiting the economic patterns described above, Borio and Lowe (2004) find
for the industrial countries that a composite indicator combining the credit and
the equity price gap performs best in predicting in-sample banking crises. Thus,
for the industrial countries, we use the domestic credit gap, equity price gap and
output gap14. Furthermore, we are able to extend the analysis by including also
the property price gap, using a measure of nominal residential property price
data15. Since the property price indicator is available on a quarterly basis only, we
base our model for the industrial countries on quarterly observations. The real
effective exchange rate gap does not contain significant information on the like-
lihood of banking crises in the industrial countries, therefore it is not included.
For the emerging markets, we find that the best composite indicator combines the
credit gap with the equity price and exchange rate gap. Thus, we use those indi-
cators in our model. Due to data constraints for property prices in the emerging
markets, using equity prices as a proxy for overall asset prices is the best we can
do.
4.4.4. Computing indicator gaps
Following Borio and Lowe (2002a, 2002b, 2004) we identify financial imbal-
ances by looking at indicator percentage deviations from a longer-term recursive
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trend (gaps)16. We use a recursively calculated HP filter,
with the recursive calculation ensuring that only information that was available
at the time of judgement is taken into account. More than just a technical refine-
ment, a recursively calculated HP filter yields different results from the standard
HP filter which uses information from the entire time series: Turning points are
much earlier for the standard HP filter, since for each considered point in time
(except the last observation) future information is taken into account. Using a
standard HP filter would thus lead to a misjudgement of the actual early warning
capabilities of the indicator in question.
The calibration of our model is based on revised data instead of real-time data.
However, in the day-to-day use, only real-time data will be available for the most
recent observations. This could lead to a noisier signal when trying to forecast
banking sector risks out of sample. The updating procedure of our model, how-
ever, assures that estimations are automatically updated as soon as the provider
publishes the revised data17. In addition, to overcome possible problems related
14 For an overview of the indicator sources, see appendix tables A-3 and A-4.
15 The dataset is constructed according to ARTHUR (2006).
16 Variations in the growth rate of the trend component are penalised by a factor of 400,000. Although we use
monthly observations for the emerging markets and quarterly observations for the industrial countries, we use
the same factor for the two distinct samples, with one exception: for the emerging markets we apply a factor of
1,500,000 to the real effective exchange rate (REER).
17 An alternative way to address this problem would be to use real-time data for in-sample calculations.
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with the use of real-time data the composite indicator is calculated as a moving
average of signals from the last three quarters for industrial countries, and nine
months for emerging markets. Also, we use a long forecast horizon (from three
to five years), which further dissipates the possible noise stemming from the revi-
sion of individual real-time observations.
4.4.5. Deriving signals
The following section and the Appendix describe the methodological heart of our
approach. We believe this section encompasses significant value-added by
describing the methodology in technical terms. To our knowledge this has not
been accomplished by the existing literature – at least not in detail. The descrip-
tion will be helpful to the reader interested in developing a similar model and all
others who wish to follow the technical details. Although more technical than the
rest of the paper, we tried to reduce the complexity of formulas and highlighted
the intuition behind them.
The database used in the model has three dimensions: (i) indicator, (ii) country,
and (iii) time. For each crisis episode we define a corresponding “crisis window”,
which precedes the actual crisis starting date. A signal falling into the “crisis win-
dow” will be counted as a “good” signal and as “noise” otherwise. Outside the
“crisis window” a signal will be counted as “noise”. In section 5 we will show
that a suitable window for industrial countries is four years and three years for
emerging markets.
Before going into the formulas we provide some notation: There are I total
number of indicators  , J total number of countries  ) and
T number of observations .  In addition, there are C number of crisis
or distress episodes (c = 1,…C). The following time line defines the different time
periods used for calculation in our model, ranging from the beginning of the sam-
ple to the most recent available data.
Only time periods between T0 and TS will be considered for in-sample calcula-
tions. Observations from TS up to T are used for the out-of-sample judgment18.
18 In-sample observations are used to calculate indicator’s thresholds. These thresholds will also be employed to
compute signals for the outs-of-sample period. However, observations from the out-of-sample period will have
no influence in the threshold optimisation process.
i 1 …I , = () j 1 …J , = ()




   0 T                                  W T                       C T                                        S T                     T  
In-sample observations 
    Crisis window
Out-of-sample observations 
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TW is the starting period of the time window set before a crisis date and TC is the
crisis window’s end-period. There will be as many crisis windows (TW to TC) as
systemic crises and distress episodes included in the sample.
A warning signal will be issued if an indicator (e.g. domestic credit to GDP) lies
above a critical threshold. More formally, the (continuous) indicator value   is
transformed into a (binary) signal at the (time discrete) period   when it crosses
the threshold  , which is a country specific threshold to the indicator  :
(1)
The Appendix includes a detailed description of the methodology employed to
calculate country-specific and aggregate percentile tresholds. The following par-
agraphs lay out how various indicator statistics, e.g. type-I error, type-II error and
noise-to-signal-ratio, are derived. These statistics are used to select optimal
thresholds. In contrast to Borio and Lowe, (2002a, 2002b, 2004) who employ
thresholds that are invariant across countries, our approach takes country-spe-
cific differences into account. In this regard, we follow Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1999) and use percentile rankings of time series values to derive critical thresh-
olds (see Appendix: Percentile threshold). This ensures that the critical percentile
cut-off is common across all countries, while accounting for country-specific
absolute threshold levels.
4.4.6. Measuring indicator performance
Once raw time series have been transformed into signals finding the “optimal”
threshold becomes an iterative process. For each threshold level   four possible
combinations need to be considered: A signal preceding a crisis episode is counted
as a good signal (A), while a signal that is not followed by crisis is counted as
noise (B). If no signal is issued, a crisis may nonetheless evolve (C), or it may not
(D). The higher the amount of good signals and the lower the number of noisy
signals, the better the indicator’s performance. In order to find the optimal thresh-
old level, type-I and type-II errors19 as well as the ratio of noise to good signals is
evaluated at different percentile levels. If the null hypothesis is defined as H0:
“Given a signal a crisis is evolving”, we can derive the following relations20:
19 Type-I error is the error committed when a “correct” null hypothesis is rejected. Type-II error is committed if a
“false” null hypothesis is not rejected.
20 Note that the conventional approach has been to define tranquil times as the null hypothesis. Yet, in order to





1  if  Xijt xij ≥









Which is the probability of not signalling a realised crisis.
(4)
Which is the probability of correctly signalling a crisis.
(5)
Which is the probability of incorrectly signalling a crisis.
(6)
Which is the noise-to-signal ratio according to Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).
Since the crisis window encompasses several periods, and thus potentially cap-
tures several signals, it is not clear from the 1 – (type-I error) statistics (4) how
many crises are actually predicted. In other words, a 1 – (type-I error) statistic of
0.5 could mean that 50% of all crises are signalled by the model, but only if the
indicator signals in every time period of the crisis window for half of the crises. It
could also mean that 100% of all crises are signalled if the indicator signals in
only half of the periods within the crisis window, but for all crises. To overcome
this problem, we developed an additional indicator, which captures the actual
number of correctly signalled crises. We call this measure “indicated crises”,
which is the share of crises correctly signalled in at least one time period within
the crisis window over the total number of crises.
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, where  (7)
Although the statistic overstates the interpretation of a single signal, it is a useful
measure to select percentile thresholds in combination with the other measures
defined above. In addition to minimising the noise-to-signal ratio, we will there-
fore ensure that each individual indicator signals a reasonable percentage of past
crises21.
4.4.7. Balancing type-I and type-II errors
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) suggest optimising critical threshold levels along
the noise-to-signal ratio. However, optimising thresholds solely on the basis of the
noise-to-signal ratio would in some cases achieve low numbers of false alarms,
but possibly at the expense of too few crises being detected. If the analyst views
the risk of missing a crisis more important than falsely calling one, then more
weight should be given to minimising type-I errors22. Thus, the optimisation rule
should involve a careful weighing between the two objectives of predicting most
crises and not producing too much noise. The following figure visualises the
trade-off between these two objectives. While a low percentile threshold will gen-
erally produce more false alarms (high type-II error), a high threshold level is
likely to miss all but the severest crises (high type-I error). The better the indicator,
the larger is its power to distinguish between crisis and tranquil periods.
21 This is in line with BORIO and LOWE (2004), p. 10. Rather than minimising the noise-to-signal ratio, they ensure
that a satisfactory number of crises are predicted.
22 For instance, DEMIRGÜC-KUNT and DETRAGIACHE (1999), pp. 12-13, propose a decision-maker loss function
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Figure 1: Low versus high thresholds23
Since we want to place a relatively large weight on minimising type-I error (avoid
missing a crisis) we set a rule to choose thresholds that ensure at least 80% of in-
sample crises are correctly signalled. We use our measure “indicated crises” as in
equation (7) to capture the actual number of crises predicted correctly. If predict-
ing 80% of all crises leads to a percentile threshold below 50%, the threshold is
assigned to that percentile24.
4.4.8. Constructing a composite index
The construction of a composite index rests on the idea that simultaneous signals
coming from multiple indicators imply a higher possibility of impending banking
sector distress. We thus combine individual indicators into a composite index.
Assessing different weighting schemes, Kaminsky (1999) finds that weighing indi-
vidual indicators by their inverse noise-to-signal ratio is the most efficient way to
combine individual indicators. This ensures that indicators with a relatively good
track record and a low noise-to-signal ratio will be assigned relatively greater
weights than indicators that in the past showed a less accurate prediction per-
formance. We thus combine individual indicators in the manner described above.
In addition to adding individual indicators, we filter out noisy signals, by averag-
ing signals across three quarters for quarterly time series and nine months for
monthly time series. Averaging over time also ensures that individual indicators
which may signal in nearby periods, but not exactly at the same time will be
captured simultaneously:
23 Observations of crisis periods on the left-hand side of the vertical threshold line represent crisis periods that
were missed (type-I error). Observations of tranquil periods on the right-hand side of the threshold represent
noisy signals (type-II error).
24 A percentile threshold below 50% will give a random character to signals instead of distinguishing between
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(8)
4.5. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MODEL
This section implements the model described above for the emerging markets and
the industrial countries, respectively. For both the emerging markets and the
industrial countries we consider crisis as well as non-crisis countries in order to
avoid selection bias25. Including non-crises countries, however, comes at a cost:
Since the concept of common percentile thresholds ensures that a certain fraction
of signals will be generated for each country, each signal in non-crisis countries
within the sample period, by definition, will be a false alarm. Thus, overall noise
levels will be higher compared to a sample that includes crisis countries only.
4.5.1. Industrial countries
Our analysis of the industrial countries covers 21 OECD countries, namely Aus-
tralia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden,
Spain, Switzerland, The United Kingdom and The United Sates.
4.5.1.1. The sample
Bordo et al. (2001) observe that banking crises were almost absent during the
period of the Bretton-Woods arrangement. They count only one larger banking
crisis between 1944 and 1973 but a total of 19 crises thereafter until 2001.
According to their analysis, the more recent period of frequent crises is only
rivalled by the inter-war years from 1919 to 193926. However, data limitations
prevent us from considering crisis episodes that evolved before the Bretton Woods
era. Due to the unique environment in which banks were operating during the
Bretton Woods system and the reduced risk of banking crisis during that time
there is little benefit in extending the sample to include the period between 1944
and 1973. Therefore, we limit our sample to quarterly observations from the
beginning of 1975 until the end of 2001. Observations of the composite index
25 Compare DEMIRGÜC-KUNT and DETRAGIACHE (1998), p. 90.
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from the beginning of 2002 until the end of 2007 (see appendix) will be out-of
sample predictions.
During that period we identify a total of 18 episodes of banking sector problems.
16 out of 21 industrial countries experienced either banking sector distress or
systemic banking crises. Only Spain (1978), Japan (1991) and the Nordic coun-
tries, Norway (1988), Finland (1991) and Sweden (1991) experienced full-blown
systemic crises (see appendix). The US distress period of 2007 is not considered
for in-sample testing. Likewise, the Spanish crisis of 1978 is excluded from our
sample since a 5-year forecast horizon prior to the crisis is not available.
4.5.1.2. The crisis window
Crisis starting periods are arbitrarily assigned to the last quarter of the crisis year
according to the identification scheme described above (see also the appendix for
an overview of crises dates). Our crisis window – as introduced in section 4 –
captures a leading horizon of 4 to 16 quarters before the actual crisis starting
date. Comparing indicator performance for different horizons, we find that this
horizon yields superior results in terms of the share of crises predicted and noise-
to-signal ratio (see sensitivity analysis below). The individual indicator results as
well as the results of the composite index in the appendix are based on this crisis
window.
4.5.1.3. The indicators
The following figures display how indicators behave around crisis starting dates.
For instance, property prices display a typical boom and bust cycle around crises
starting dates: on average, yoy growth in property prices peaks three years prior
to crisis. Property prices decline or remain depressed for at least five years follow-
ing the onset of a crisis. Also for domestic credit and real GDP the boom and bust
cycles around crisis starting dates are quite pronounced, whereas for equity prices
the development is more ambiguous.
Indicator behaviour around crisis dates also allows us to narrow down possible
options for setting the forecast horizon. Later in this section we compare different
forecast horizons ranging from 2 years until 5 years before crisis starting dates.
Note that for descriptive purposes the figures below show yoy percentage
changes. For our analysis, however, indicators are computed as percentage devi-
ation from their respective long-term trend and translated into signals based on
common percentile threshold according to equations in the Appendix.
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Figure 2: Indicator behaviour around crisis starting dates – industrial countries
4.5.1.4. The indicator thresholds
At this point we want to determine the “optimal” threshold levels for the indica-
tors in question. However, optimality in this case depends on our somewhat sub-
jective decision on how to balance type-I error (missing too many crises) against
type-II error (producing too much noise) as discussed above. To be able to make
an informed choice, a grid search is performed27. The results of this grid search
27 By using the term “grid search” we refer to the calculation of the statistics used to assess indicator performance,
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are summarised by the charts depicted in the appendix, Figure A-1. Each point on
the x-axis represents a percentile threshold for which the type-I error, type-II
error, share of indicated crises and noise-to-signal-ratio are calculated respec-
tively.
For the output gap, we find a common percentile threshold of 60% to satisfy our
selection rule as postulated in section 4.4.7.28. For the credit gap, equity price gap
and property price gap the threshold is 65%, 50% and 80%, respectively. Com-
paring the performance of different indicators, the property price gap offers the
lowest noise-to-signal ratio of 0.23 as most of the crises were preceded by boom-
ing property prices. The credit gap is the second best indicator with a noise-to-
signal ratio of 0.33 and the output gap is the third best with a noise-to-signal ratio
of 0.38. The equity price gap is the worst performing indicator, with a noise-to-
signal ratio of 0.75. Compared to property prices, fewer crises were preceded by
booming equity prices and more equity price boom and bust cycles did not lead
to subsequent banking crises. The composite index displays a lower noise-to-sig-
nal ratio (0.11) than any of the individual indicators. Apparently, combining
information from individual indicators reduces overall noise levels. The weights
within the composite indicator reflect individual indicator performance, with the
property prices gap constituting the most important individual indicator.
Table 1: Individual thresholds and weights within the composite indicator – 
industrial countries
4.5.1.5. Sensitivity analysis: time horizon
Both the time horizon as well the threshold levels are important parameters to
calibrate the model, which determine its overall performance. Thus, in order to
assess the robustness of the chosen parameters we run different specifications of
the model varying either the forecast horizon (crisis window) or the threshold
level of individual indicators29.
28 This rule ensures that at least 80% of in-sample crises are signalled correctly. If that constraint yields a percentile













Output gap 60%  0.25 0.29 0.38 81.3% 23%
Credit gap 65% 0.23 0.25 0.33 81.3% 27%
Equity price gap 50% 0.42 0.43 0.75 81.3% 12%
Property price gap 80% 0.38 0.14 0.23 80.0% 38%
Composite 73% 0.42 0.06 0.11 80.0% 100%
29 Out-of-sample tests further confirmed the robustness of the model. However, given a limited number of crises
and country observations, absolute threshold levels vary depending on the chosen in-sample definition.
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We start by looking at different forecast horizons. The forecast horizon is defined
as the time before the crisis date, where a signal is considered a “good” signal or
a “false alarm” as described in section 4. Recall that a horizon of three years
would mean an alert of banking crisis after the signal is triggered for the following
three years. In order to find the optimal forecast horizon we test for a wide range
of different horizons30. We consider 8, 12 and 16 quarters prior to crisis, as well
as 16 quarters excluding the first 4 quarters before crisis, and 20 quarters exclud-
ing the first 8 quarters. In order to compare model performance across different
specifications, we determine individual thresholds but also thresholds for the
composite indicator as stated above: Percentile threshold must not exceed 50%,
while the percentage of indicated crisis should exceed 80%.
Table 2: Indicator performance with varying time horizons – industrial countries
30 BORIO and LOWE (2004) find that for the industrial countries a crisis window encompassing five years prior to
crisis (excluding the 2 years before the crisis) yields superior results. By contrast, KAMINSKY and REINHART
(1999) and KAMINSKY (1999) use a crisis window encompassing 12 months before and 12 months after the














Output gap 50% 0.28 0.44 0.61 75% 21%
Domestic credit gap 65% 0 . 2 20 . 2 80 . 3 68 1 % 3 6 %
Equity price gap 50% 0.63 0.48 1.27 38% 10%
Property price gap 65% 0.23 0.29 0.38 80% 34%
Composite 50% 0.27 0.32 0.44 73% 100%
12 quarters
Output gap 60% 0.34 0.31 0.48 81% 21%
Domestic credit gap 70% 0 . 3 00 . 2 20 . 3 18 1 % 3 2 %
Equity price gap 50% 0.50 0.46 0.91 75% 11%
Property price gap 75% 0.32 0.19 0.28 80% 36%
Composite 50% 0.32 0.21 0.30 73% 100%
16 quarters
Output gap 60% 0.31 0.29 0.42 81% 21%
Domestic credit gap 75% 0 . 3 60 . 1 70 . 2 68 1 % 3 3 %
Equity price gap 50% 0.46 0.43 0.81 81% 11%
Property price gap 80% 0.41 0.14 0.24 80% 36%
Composite 63% 0.36 0.10 0.15 80% 100%
16 quarters (excluding 4 qtrs before crisis)
Output gap 60% 0.25 0.29 0.38 81% 23%
Domestic credit gap 65% 0 . 2 30 . 2 50 . 3 38 1 % 2 7 %
Equity price gap 50% 0.42 0.43 0.75 81% 12%
Property price gap 80% 0.38 0.14 0.23 80% 38%
Composite 73% 0.42 0.06 0.11 80% 100%
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A horizon of 16 quarters (excluding the first 4 quarters before a crisis) yields the
lowest noise-to-signal ratio, holding the level of indicated crises constant. The
results confirm the importance of property prices as an important indicator for
assessing the risk of banking sector problems. Except for the 8 quarters horizon,
the property price gap has the largest weight in all the specifications, reflecting its
superior performance relative to the other indicators. The domestic credit gap
together with the property price gap constitutes 58%-60% of the composite
index. The results confirm that the equity price gap displays the least favourable
performance as measured by noise-to-signal ratios and percentages of indicated
crises.
4.5.1.6. Sensitivity analysis: threshold level
Next, we assess two additional specifications: one with a 10% higher threshold
of individual indicators; the other with a 10% lower threshold compared to the
base case. This allows us to check the robustness of the composite indicator with
regard to our threshold selection rule. Ideally, the composite index should display
superior performance qualities compared to the two alternative cases. For the
individual indicators, we expect the higher threshold (+10%) to produce fewer
false alarms, while missing more crises. The lower threshold (-10%) is likely to
predict most of the crisis but only at the expense of producing more noise than
the base case.
In this exercise, we stick to the crisis window of 16 quarters (excluding 4 qtrs
before crisis). Again, we keep to our rule that thresholds for the composite index
are set at either 80% of indicated crises or the 50% percentile. Results are sum-
marised in Table 3.
20 quarters (excluding 8 qtrs before crisis)
Output gap 65% 0.23 0.21 0.28 88% 28%
Domestic credit gap 65% 0.23 0.25 0.32 81% 24%
Equity price gap 50% 0.33 0.41 0.61 88% 13%
Property price gap 80% 0.35 0.15 0.23 80% 34%
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Table 3: Indicator performance with varying threshold levels – industrial countries
This test confirms the robustness of our threshold selection rule, as the overall
performance of the composite indicator (measured by the noise-to-signal ratio) is
best for our base case. Comparing individual indicator performance, the low
threshold yields a higher type-II error and a lower type-I error. The reverse is true
for the high threshold. While these results do not come as a surprise, it is note-
worthy that they are not necessarily mirrored by the composite index. Holding
the percentage of crises predicted constant, the -10% threshold yields a noise-to-
signal ratio of the composite equal to that of the “optimal” specification. This can
be explained by the trade-off between type-I and type-II errors within the com-
posite. Apparently, the more noisy signals will be compensated by a higher
number of crises predicted, resulting in a relatively low noise-to-signal ratio at the
chosen high threshold of the composite. Also, the differences in weighing and the
accumulation across signals of different kinds play an important role for the per-
formance of the composite indicator.
4.5.2. Emerging markets
Our analysis of emerging markets covers 36 countries from different regions. In
Latin America we include: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and
Venezuela; in Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hun-













Output gap 50% 0.20 0.40 0.50 88% 22%
Domestic credit gap 55% 0 . 2 30 . 3 50 . 4 58 1 % 2 5 %
Equity price gap 40% 0.27 0.52 0.71 94% 16%
Property price gap 70% 0.22 0.23 0.30 80% 37%
Composite 75% 0.27 0.12 0.17 80% 100%
Base threshold (+/-0%)
Output gap 60% 0.25 0.29 0.38 81% 23%
Domestic credit gap 65% 0 . 2 30 . 2 50 . 3 38 1 % 2 7 %
Equity price gap 50% 0.42 0.43 0.75 81% 12%
Property price gap 80% 0.38 0.14 0.23 80% 38%
Composite 73%  0.42 0.06 0.11 80% 100%
High threshold (+10%)
Output gap 70% 0.45 0.19 0.35 75% 18%
Domestic credit gap 75% 0 . 3 60 . 1 70 . 2 77 5 % 2 4 %
Equity price gap 60% 0.55 0.34 0.75 56% 9%
Property price gap 90% 0.52 0.06 0.13 67% 49%
Composite 50% 0.45 0.07 0.13 60% 100%
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Asia: China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sin-
gapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam and in Africa & Middle East:
Egypt, Israel, Nigeria, South Africa and Turkey.
4.5.2.1. The sample
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) mentioned that the event of banking crisis was
rather seldom with regulated financial markets during the 1970s. The number of
crises increased significantly in the post-liberalisation period during the 1980s
and 1990s. We observed that several Latin American countries experienced bank-
ing crises during the 1980s, mainly driven by the withdrawal of international
capital, inadequate regulation, real effective exchange rate appreciation com-
bined with pegged exchange rates and highly dollarised banking systems. In the
early 1990s, with the monetary and fiscal convergence in the preparation for pos-
sible future EMU accession, many Eastern European countries experienced bank-
ing crises. Between 1997 and 1998, Asian banking sectors collapsed when capital
inflows turned into outflows with currency pegs, highly leveraged corporate sec-
tors and unhedged short-term debts. Afterwards, similar macroeconomic vulner-
abilities triggered banking crises in Mexico (1994), Russia (1998), Turkey (2000)
and Argentina (2001). The appendix lists the periods of distress and baking crises
experienced by emerging markets since 1990.
Data restrictions prevent us from starting our in sample calculation before Janu-
ary 1990, leaving out Latin American and Eastern European banking crises but
including Asian crises and other significant banking crises experienced in the
1990s31. Within the sample of 36 countries a total of 28 systemic crises and 8
periods of banking sector distress were identified but only 19 of these periods (15
systemic crises and 4 periods of distress) are captured by the composite indicator
on account of data restrictions. The remaining crises and distress periods are still
in the model, captured by individual indicators. The in-sample calculation of the
model runs from 1990 to 2004. Observations of the composite index from the
beginning of 2005 until the end of 2007 (see appendix) will be out-of-sample
predictions.
4.5.2.2. The crisis window
Since the precise months of banking crises are difficult to identify, systemic crises
and distress periods are arbitrarily assigned to the month of December in the
respective year. For emerging markets, the 36-months window before crisis dates
was found to be the most efficient in terms of low noise-to-signal ratios and ade-
31 Many Eastern European countries suffered banking crises between 1990 and 1992 which are excluded from our
sample since a 3-year forecast horizon prior to crisis is not warranted.
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quately predicted banking crises (see sensitivity analysis) which will be our bench-
mark model to assess individual indicator performance.
4.5.2.3. The indicators
Around crisis dates the boom and bust cycle of the explanatory variables can be
also observed in emerging markets. On average, credit started to accelerate three
years before crisis dates to slow down some months before crisis dates. The REER
experienced a slow and modest increase about four years before crisis dates to
plummet sharply after crises. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) observed that prob-
lems in the banking sector typically precede currency crises but sharp devalua-
tions afterwards aggravate banking sector problems. Peaks of stock prices are
distributed in different time periods five years before crisis dates. We test different
time horizons to assess the performance of the model, but given the simultaneous
approach of signals from individual indicators, we can anticipate an enhanced
performance of the model on a 36-months time horizon.
Figure 3: Indicator behaviour around crisis starting dates – emerging markets
4.5.2.4. The indicator thresholds
The selection of percentage thresholds for emerging market indicators follows the
same rule of industrial countries, i.e. setting individual percentile thresholds to
capture at least 80% of indicated crises and assigning a 50% percentile threshold
when the first condition does not apply (in some models it is not possible to
obtain the pre-fixed percentage of indicated crises). Figure A-2 in the appendix
yields a graphical a representation of the result from the grid search, the selected


















t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5
Argentina (2001) Mexico (1994)
Philippines  (1998) Russia (1998)
Thailand(1997) Turkey (2000)
All average
Equity price index 








t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5
Argentina (2001) Mexico (1994)
Philippines  (1998) Russia (1998)
Thailand(1997) Turkey (2000)
All average









t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5
Argentina (2001) Mexico (1994)
Philippines  (1998) Russia (1998)
Thailand(1997) Turkey (2000)
All average
Real effective exchange rate
yoy change (%)
SUERF2010_3.book  Page 80  Thursday, June 17, 2010  12:09 PMMONITORING BANKING SECTOR RISKS – AN APPLIED APPROACH 81
larcier
Table 4: Individual thresholds and weights within the composite indicator – 
emerging markets
The credit gap is the individual indicator with superior performance. The REER
indicator displays a high percentage of predicted past crises but a relative sizable
noise-to-signal ratio. The equity index is the indicator with inferior performance.
Considering the superior performance the credit gap is the most important indi-
vidual indicator for emerging markets.
Similarly to the industrial countries, the composite indicator displays a lower
noise-to-signal ratio than all individual indicators, highlighting the advantage of
combining individual signals. At 75% of indicated crises, the composite indicator
has a noise-to-signal ratio of 0.27.
4.5.2.5. Sensitivity analysis: time horizon
We ran the model for the same time horizons tested in industrial countries. To
compare different models, we fixed the percentage of indicated crises at the values
mentioned in the previous table with the condition that percentile threshold must
be at least 50%.
With the percentage of indicated crises for the composite indicator fixed at 75%,
the 36-months time horizon model minimises the noise-to-signal ratio. In the con-
text of the selected time horizon, a composite indicator signal can be interpreted
as possible banking sector distress within the next 36 months after the signal is
triggered. The persistence of the signal should be also considered in assessing the
probability of a distress period.
The superior performance of the credit gap indicator is verified given that this
indicator gained the highest weight in all models but the 60-months (excluding
24 m before crisis) model. A longer time horizon benefits the equity price gap as
peaks of this variable were distributed along a five-year horizon before crisis
dates, but the two other indicators display a higher noise-to-signal ratio and
smaller percentage of indicated crises in the 60-months time horizon model. The
performance of the composite indicator worsens in longer time horizons on













Credit gap 70% 0.55 0.28 0.63 88.% 39%
REER gap 60% 0.48 0.42 0.80 93% 31%
Equity price gap 60% 0.59 0.33 0.82 86% 30%
Composite 63% 0.77 0.06 0.27 75% 100%
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While the noise-to-signal ratio of the REER gap tends to increase in longer time
horizons (from 24 to 48 months), the best performances of the credit gap indica-
tor and the composite indicator are reached at a 36-months time horizon.
Table 5: Indicator performance with varying time horizons – emerging markets
4.5.2.6. Sensitivity analysis: threshold level
With the selected model of 36-months time horizon we analysed the indicators’
performance with different individual thresholds, i.e. we analyzed a +/- 10%
change in individual thresholds. To compare results we have fixed the percentage
of indicated crises at previous levels.
In general, higher individual thresholds mean higher individual noise-to-signal
ratios at a fixed percentage of indicated crises. However, base thresholds are the
optimal thresholds for the composite indicator, given that the noise-to-signal ratio














Credit gap 59% 0.46 0.40 0.73 88% 33%
REER gap 54% 0.39 0.47 0.77 93% 31%
Equity price gap 60% 0.53 0.32 0.67 86% 36%
Composite 50% 0.51 0.29 0.58 75% 100%
36 months 
Credit gap 70% 0.55 0.28 0.63 88% 39%
REER gap 60% 0.48 0.42 0.80 93% 31%
Equity price gap 60% 0.59 0.33 0.82 86% 30%
Composite 63% 0.77 0.06 0.27 75% 100%
48 months 
Credit gap 75% 0.62 0.25 0.65 88% 37%
REER gap 70% 0.61 0.34 0.88 93% 28%
Equity price gap 63% 0.58 0.29 0.69 86% 35%
Composite 50% 0.78 0.08 0.35 70% 100%
48 months (excluding 12 m before crisis)
Credit gap 65% 0.48 0.35 0.67 88% 38%
REER gap 51% 0.39 0.54 0.88 93% 29%
Equity price gap 62% 0.60 0.32 0.79 86% 32%
Composite 50% 0.49 0.23 0.45 75% 100%
60 months (excluding 24 m before crisis)
Credit gap 50% 0.34 0.55 0.84 77% 31%
REER gap 50% 0.36 0.59 0.92 86% 28%
Equity price gap 75% 0.73 0.17 0.63 86% 41%
Composite 50% 0.55 0.24 0.54 70% 100%
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Table 6: Indicator performance with varying threshold levels – emerging markets
4.6. CONCLUSION
This paper develops an early-warning system to capture adverse macroeconomic
developments, which in the past have led to large-scale problems in the banking
sector. We show how such a model can be implemented in practice, addressing
the specific requirements of an internationally operating private sector institu-
tion. We argue that the incorporation of an early-warning system into credit risk
management can be an effective means to address disaster myopia and the lack of
institutional memory, which have been blamed for short-sighted credit policy by
the private sector before.
We implement the proposed model for both the industrial countries and emerging
markets. Separate consideration of the two samples allows us to consider differ-
ent indicators, sample periods and crisis forecast windows. Our results affirm
those of previous studies, which show that excessively rising credit to GDP in
combination with booming asset prices were often at the heart of banking sector
problems. We contribute to that literature by also assessing property prices and
show – for the industrial countries – that the property price gap is a superior
indicator compared to the equity price gap.
Overall performance of the model is in line with the literature. At the reported
threshold levels, the industrial countries composite indicator predicts 80% of the
in-sample crisis periods, while achieving a relatively low noise-to-signal ratio of













Credit gap 60% 0.43 0.38 0.67 92% 38%
REER gap 50% 0.37 0.52 0.82 96% 31%
Equity price gap 50% 0.49 0.44 0.86 86% 30%
Composite 67% 0.64 0.13 0.37 75% 100%
Base threshold (+/-0%)
Credit gap 70% 0.55 0.28 0.63 88% 39%
REER gap 60% 0.48 0.42 0.80 93% 31%
Equity price gap 60% 0.59 0.33 0.82 86% 30%
Composite 63% 0.77 0.06 0.27 75% 100%
High threshold (+10%)
Credit gap 80% 0.67 0.18 0.54 77% 41%
REER gap 70% 0.61 0.32 0.82 86% 27%
Equity price gap 70% 0.69 0.22 0.71 67% 31%
Composite 50% 0.77 0.07 0.31 65% 100%
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crisis periods, with a noise-to-signal ratio of 0.27. For both models the equity
price indicator seems to perform worse, while the domestic credit gap always
ranks among the best indicators. Combining individual indicators into a compos-
ite index reduces overall noise levels.
While the model performs relatively well in terms of predicting in-sample crisis
episodes, a number of limitations need to be taken into account when interpreting
out-of-sample predictions: first, it will be difficult to determine future starting
dates of banking sector problems once a signal is issued, because – by construc-
tion – the forecast horizon encompasses several years. Thus, a crisis may evolve
shortly after the issuance of a signal or up to four years later in the industrial
countries and up to three years later in the emerging markets. Second, just like
any other forecasting tool, the predictive power of the proposed systems depends
on future crises following patterns observed in previous ones. Third, given our
preference for capturing a high fraction of crises and including countries that did
not experience crises, the model will likely produce a considerable number of
false alarms. Finally, the model looks only at common macroeconomic threats to
the banking sector. It neglects the resilience of the banking system to deal with
such threats, as well as further threats stemming from idiosyncratic shocks and
subsequent contagion effects. These caveats stress the necessity to regard the
early-warning system as merely a further building block of a more comprehensive
risk assessment programme, which also incorporates measuring the resilience of
the banking sector on an aggregate as well as a micro-prudential level. In fact, a
crisis signal should only be taken as a first call to monitor more closely banking
sector vulnerabilities in the country concerned; while the absence of a signal
should not lead to the negligence of possible banking sector risks.
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Suppose now   is a real-valued random variable and its cumulative distribution
function (cfd) is given by   for  . If we assign probabil-
ity of   to each of the observations  , we are able to define the empirical
distribution function as:
, for  (A-1)
With   being the indicator function, which – for a given threshold   – yields
one if the indicator is equal to or below the threshold and zero otherwise.   is
the number of time periods included in the sample and   is the cumulative
frequency of observations less than or equal to  , increasing from zero to one.
This is how we calculate the percentage share of signals for a given threshold  .
If we want to calculate the country specific thresholds, given a certain percentile
level, we need to use the quantile function32:
, for  (A-2)
First, we chose a certain percentile level  , then, we determine the country-
specific thresholds so that  . In order to derive indicator signals, we
insert the country-specific thresholds   that will trigger individual signals into
equation (1) (p. 68). We can now calculate the (aggregate) empirical distribution
of signals – spanning the time as well as the country dimension. This corresponds
to one minus the (aggregate) frequency of signals. Using the signals   as defined
in equation (1) (p. 68) we receive:
(A-3)
Where  , which is the total number of observations for all countries
and all time periods within the sample (number of panel observations), and   is
the common percentile threshold for indicator  . Note that each percentile
threshold at the aggregate level corresponds to the same percentile threshold at
the country level, while the absolute thresholds   are country-spe-
32 Where inf is the abbreviation of “infimum”, meaning the largest lower boundary.
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cific. To exemplify, the common percentile threshold level for the credit gap is
70%. Looking at the historic time series of Singapore reveals that 30% (100%-
70%) of all credit gap observations are above 4%. By contrast, Estonia has seen
more episodes of comparably high output gaps – here the 70% percentile thresh-
old level corresponds to a threshold value of 5.8%. Consequently, a warning-
signal for Singapore will be issued as soon as the credit gap exceeds 4%, while
Estonia will not trigger a signal unless the credit gap exceeds 5.8%.
Table A-1: Crisis dates industrial countries
Country Date Comment
Australia 1989-1992
Distress: Two large banks received government aid, fiscal costs 
amounted to 2% of GDP, NPL were 6% of total assets (1991-92)
Canada 1990-1992
Distress: Large loan losses at Canadian banks and trusts due to real 
estate price collapse
1983-1985
Distress: Fifteen members of the Canadian Deposit Insurance 
Corporation failed, including two banks
Denmark 1987-1992
Distress: 40 out of 60 problem banks were merged, accumulative loan 
losses amounted to 9% of total loans (1990-92)
Finland 1991-1994
Crisis: Savings banks were badly affected by macro shocks, government 
took control of three banks representing 31% of total deposits
France 1994-1995
Distress: Credit Lyonnais experienced serious problems, estimated losses 
totalled USD 10 bn.
Germany 2002-2003
Distress: The banking sector experienced structural problems after 
equity market bust; failure of some smaller institutions (e.g. Schmidt 
Bank, Gontard & MetallBank, BkmU Bank, and others)
Greece 1991-1995
Distress: Significant injections of public funds into troubled specialised 
lending institutions
Italy 1992-1995
Distress: Between 1990-94, 58 problem banks were merged, accounting 
for 11% of total lending
Japan 1991-2003
Crisis: Up to March 2002, 180 deposit taking institutions were 
dissolved, fiscal costs for dealing with NPL amounted to 20% of GDP
New Zealand 1987-1990
Distress: Solvency problems of one large state-owned bank due to high 
levels of NPL, capital injection of 1% of GDP
Norway 1988-1993
Crisis: Smaller regional banks, and later large banks, experienced 
difficulties caused by deep recession, recapitalisation costs amounted to 
8% of GDP
Spain 1978-1983
Crisis: 52 of 110 banks experienced solvency problems, broad 
government intervention, estimated losses amounted to 17% of GNP
1993
Distress: First half of 1990s: failures of small banks; 1993: failure of 
Banesto
Sweden 1991-1992
Crisis: 2 large banks were insolvent, 5 out of the 6 largest banks 
experienced difficulties, recapitalisation costs amounted to 4% of GDP
Switzerland 1991-1996
Distress: Banks incurred estimated losses of more than 10% of GDP; 
regional problem-banks were merged to mitigate problems
UK 1991-1992
Distress: ‘Small Banks Crisis’: a number of small banks failed due to 
credit losses during recession
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Sources: Caprio and Klingebiel (2003); Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996), BIS (2004); except for
Germany (own estimate) and Canada (Illing and Liu 2003).
Although some sources identify an episode of distress also for Portugal (1986-1989), this episode is not included as
major indicators for Portugal are only available from 1988 onwards.
Table A-2: Crisis dates emerging markets
USA 1983-1991
Distress: 1320 savings and loans institutions failed, estimated resolution 




Crisis. Major commercial banks and most large investment banks (incl. 
Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae) either 
defaulted, were closed by the authorities or forced to merge. Large scale 








Systemic crisis: A bank run started in 2001, withdrawal restrictions on 
deposits were imposed and fixed-term deposits reprogrammed. In 2002, 
bank assets were asymmetrically pesified affecting banks solvency. One 
bank closed and three were nationalised by 2003.
Brazil 1994-1999
Systemic crisis: The central bank intervened or took the temporary 
administration of 43 institutions. NPLs reached 15% by end-1997.
Bulgaria 1995-1997
Systemic crisis: The banking system experienced a bank run in 1996 and 
19 banks closed (one third of total banking assets).
China 1990s 
Systemic crisis: Larger state-owned banks (68% of total banking assets) 
were deemed insolvent at the end of 1998. NPLs were estimated at 50%.
Croatia 1996
Systemic crisis: Five banks (about 50% of total banking system loans) 




Systemic crisis: Several banks closed and NLPs reached 38% in 1994-
95.
Egypt 1991-95 Distress: Four banks received capital assistance.
Estonia 1992-1995
Systemic crisis: Several banks were deemed insolvent (41% of assets), 
five licences were revoked and four major banks were merged, 
nationalised or helped by the recovery agency.
1994 Systemic crisis: One bank who controlled 10% of total assets failed.
1998 Distress: Five small banks failed.
Hong Kong 1998 Distress: One large investment bank failed.
Hungary 1991-1995





Distress: Non-performing assets reached 11% in 1993-94 and 16% in 
1998.
Indonesia 1994
Distress: Non-performing assets reached 14% and more than 70% were 
held by state banks.
1997-no 
end date
Systemic crisis: By 2007, 70 banks were closed and 13 nationalised of a 
total of 237 banks. NPLs were estimated at 65-75% at the peak of the 
crisis.
Country Date Comment
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Systemic crisis: By 2002, 5 banks were forced to exit the market, 303 
institutions closed (215 credit unions) and 4 banks were nationalised. 




Systemic crisis: Between 1994 and 1999, 35 banks saw their licences 
revoked, were closed or ceased operations.
Lithuania 1995-1996
Systemic crisis: 12 small banks (out of 25 banks) were liquidated, 3 





Systemic crisis: Total number of finance companies was reduced to 10 
from 39 and two insolvent banks merged. NPLs peaked at 25-35%.
Mexico 1994-1997
Systemic crisis: Government intervened at 9 banks and 11 of 34 
commercial banks participated in a capitalisation programme.
Nigeria 1990s 
Systemic crisis: Insolvent banks accounted for 20% of banking system 
assets were insolvent in 1993 and in 1993 almost 50% of banks 
reported financial distress.




Systemic crisis: One commercial bank, 7 of 88 thrifts and 40 of 750 rural 
banks were placed under receivership. NPLs reached 12% in 1998.
Poland 1990s 
Systemic crisis: 7 of 9 treasury-owned commercial banks (90% of the 




Systemic crisis: NPLs reached 25-30% in six major state-owned banks 
in 1998.
Russia 1995
Systemic crisis: The interbank loan market stopped working in 1995 due 
to concerns about connected lending by new banks.
1998-1999
Systemic crisis: About 720 banks (4% of total assets add 32% of retail 
deposits) were deemed insolvent and 18 banks (10% of total assets and 
41% of deposits) experienced serious difficulties.
Taiwan 1995
Distress: Failure of an important credit cooperative sparked round on 
other credit unions.




Systemic crisis: 59 of 91 financial companies and one bank (of 15 banks) 
have to close. In addition, 4 banks were nationalised (of 15 banks). 
NPLs reached 33%.
Turkey 1994 Distress: three banks failed.
2000-no 
end date
Systemic crisis: two banks closed and 19 banks were taken over by the 
Savings Deposits Insurance Fund.
Ukraine 1997-1998
Systemic crisis: 32 of 195 banks were liquidated and 25 underwent 
financial rehabilitation. Bad loans reached 50-60% of assets in some 
banks. In 1998, government’s decision to restructure debt hit banks.
Venezuela 1994-1995
Systemic crisis: Insolvent banks accounted for 35% of financial system 





Systemic crisis: two of four state-owned banks were deemed insolvent 
and the other two experienced solvency problems (51% of total banking 
loans). NPLs reached 18%.
Country Date Comment
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Table A-3: Indicators industrial countries
Table A-4: Indicators emerging markets
Indicatora
a. All indicators are constructed as gaps between the actual series and an underlying ex ante recursively calculated
HP trend (expressed as percentage of the trend level). The larger the (positive) deviation from the long-term trend,
the higher the risk of banking sector problems.
Underlying series Rationale Data source
Credit gap
Domestic credit to 
the private sector / 
GDP 
Banks will be adversely affected by 
an abrupt down-turn of the credit 
cycle. If credit and asset prices 
collapse simultaneously, adverse 
effects on bank stability will be even 
more pronounced.






An equity price collapse may 
adversely affect the banking system, 
either directly via bank balance 
sheets or indirectly via decreasing 




and IFS Line 62
Property price gap
National residential 
housing price index 
(in nominal terms)
A property price collapse may 
adversely affect the banking system, 
either directly via bank balance 
sheets or indirectly via decreasing 






A fall in real economic activity will 
adversely influence the quality of 




a. All indicators are constructed as gaps between the actual series and an underlying ex ante recursively calculated
HP trend (expressed as percentage of the trend level). The larger the (positive) deviation from the long-term trend,
the higher the risk of banking sector problems.
Underlying series Rationale Data source
Credit gap
Domestic credit to 
the private sector / 
GDP 
Banks will be adversely affected by 
an abrupt down-turn in the credit 
cycle. If credit and asset prices 
collapse simultaneously, adverse 
effects on bank stability will be even 
more pronounced.
Credit: IFS Line 22d/





An equity price collapse may 
adversely affect the banking system, 
either directly via bank balance 
sheets or indirectly via decreasing 
collateral value and fee & 
commission income.







For emerging markets, and specially 
for small and open economies, the 
REER appreciation captures capital 
inflows pressures as well as 
potential build-up of foreign 
currency mismatches
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Figure A-1: Indicator performance – industrial countries
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Figure A-2: Indicator performance – emerging markets
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Figure A-3: Example of web-based output – industrial countries
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Figure A-4: Example of web-based output – emerging markets
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SUERF2010_3.book  Page 98  Thursday, June 17, 2010  12:09 PM99
larcier
5. ASSET PRICE FLUCTUATIONS, FINANCIAL CRISES 




The deepening of the recent crisis was driven by the simultaneous devaluation of
stock wealth, housing wealth and commodity wealth. The potential for this deval-
uation process had been “built up” during the boom of stock prices, house prices
and commodity prices between 2003 and 2007. Hence, this paper sketches the
main causes and effects of long swings in asset prices in the context of the current
crisis. It is shown that “bull markets” are brought about by upward price runs
(i.e., monotonic movements) lasting longer than counter-movements for an
extended period of time (and vice versa for “bear markets”). This pattern of asset
price dynamics is the result of “trading as usual” on (highly regulated) derivatives
exchanges. The most popular trading practices like “technical analysis” contrib-
ute significantly to asset price overshooting. These practices strengthened both,
the boom of asset prices until mid 2007 as well as their collapse in recent months.
A general financial transaction tax would limit the wide fluctuations of stock
prices, exchange rates and commodity prices.
JEL: E30, F31, G12, G13, G14, H25
Keywords: Boom and bust of asset prices, speculation, technical trading, transac-
tion tax.
5.1. INTRODUCTION
Within 18 months a mortgage crisis in the US has turned into a deep crisis of the
world economy. This process was (and in part still is) driven by the simultaneous
devaluation of stock wealth, housing wealth and commodity wealth. The deval-
uation reduces consumption and investment directly as well as indirectly (e.g., via
the devaluation of pension and college funds, of credit collaterals and through the
deterioration of the current account of commodity exporters). The potential for
the decline of stock prices, house prices and commodity prices had been “built
up” during the boom of these asset prices between 2003 and 2007.
This paper sketches the main causes and effects of long swings in asset prices in
the context of the current crisis. These fluctuations are the outcome of “trading
as usual” on (highly regulated) derivatives exchanges. The most popular trading
practices like “technical analysis” contribute significantly to asset price over-
shooting. Hence, these practices and the related “speed” of transactions strength-
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ened both, the boom of asset prices until mid 2007 as well as their collapse in
recent months. A general financial transaction tax would limit the fluctuations of
stock prices, exchange rates and commodity prices.
5.2. THE “FUNDAMENTALIST HYPOTHESIS” AND THE 
“BULL-BEAR-HYPOTHESIS” OF ASSET PRICE DYNAMICS
According to mainstream economic theory, asset prices are determined by the
respective equilibrium conditions, i.e., by the so-called market fundamentals.
Hence, destabilizing speculation will influence prices at best over the very short
run (if at all). In this chapter, I shall at first summarize the main assumptions of
this theoretically (deductively) derived concept of asset price formation which I
term “fundamentalist hypothesis”. I will then discuss the key elements of the
alternative “bull-bear-hypothesis” which is rather empirically oriented.
The main assumptions of the “fundamentalist hypothesis” can be summarized as
follows (see also figure 1 and table 1):
– the theoretical benchmark model of the “fundamentalist hypothesis” is an
ideal, frictionless market where all participants are equipped with perfect
knowledge and where no transaction costs exist (“world 0”);
– the model underlying the “fundamentalist hypothesis” relaxes the assump-
tions of perfect knowledge and of no transaction costs. Also in this “world I”
actors are fully rational, but they do not know the expectations of other
actors. Hence, prices cannot reach a new equilibrium instantaneously but
only through a gradual price discovery process;
– the high transaction volumes in modern financial markets stem mainly from
the activities of market makers. The latter provide just the liquidity necessary
for facilitating and smoothing the movements of asset prices towards their
fundamental equilibrium;
– speculation is an indispensable component of both, the price discovery proc-
ess as well as the distribution of risks. As part of the former, speculation is
essentially stabilizing, i.e., it moves prices smoothly and quickly to their fun-
damental equilibrium (Friedman, 1953);
– an endogenous overshooting caused by excessive speculation does not exist.
Any deviation of asset prices from their fundamental equilibrium is due to
exogenous shocks and, hence, is only a temporary phenomenon;
– the emergence of news and shocks follows a random walk and so do asset
prices. Therefore, speculation techniques based on past prices cannot be sys-
tematically profitable (otherwise the market would not even be “weakly effi-
cient” – Fama, 1970).
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The “bull-bear-hypothesis” perceives trading behaviour and price dynamics in
asset markets as follows (“world II”):
– imperfect knowledge is a general condition of social interaction. As a conse-
quence, actors use different models and process different information sets
when forming expectations and making decisions1;
– as human beings, actors’ expectations and transactions are governed not only
by rational calculations, but also by emotional und social factors;
– not only are expectations heterogeneous but they are often formed only qual-
itatively, i.e., as regards the direction of a price movement. E.g., in modern
financial markets traders try to gauge within seconds if news will drive the
price rather up or rather down;
– upward (downward) price movements – usually triggered by news – are
lengthened by “cascades” of buy (sell) signals stemming from trend-following
technical trading systems;
– the “trending” behaviour of asset prices (based on daily or intraday data) is
fostered by the dominance of either a “bullish” or a “bearish” bias in expec-
tations. News which are in line with the prevailing “market mood” gets
higher recognition and reaction than news which contradict the “market
mood”;
– in the aggregate, this behaviour of market participants cause price runs in line
with the “market mood” to last longer than counter-movements. In such a
way short-term runs accumulate to long-term trends, i.e., “bull markets” and
“bear markets”;
– the sequence of these trends then constitutes the pattern in long-term asset
price dynamics: Prices develop in irregular cycles around the fundamental
equilibrium without any tendency to converge towards this level.
1 In a recent, pathbreaking book, FRYDMAN and GOLDBERG (2007) demonstrate that recognizing the importance
of imperfect knowledge is key to understanding outcomes in financial markets.
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Figure 1: Three stylized paths of asset prices
In order to clarify the theoretical differences between the “fundamentalist
hypothesis” and the “bull-bear-hypothesis”, it is useful to distinguish between
three (theoretical) paths of asset prices, depending on the assumptions made
about market conditions (figure 1):
– in “world 0”, new information at t = 1 causes the asset price to jump instan-
taneously from the old equilibrium at P = 100 (at point A) to the new equi-
librium at P = 104 (B). The price stays there until news in t = 3 cause the price
to jump to P = 102 (E). Finally, in t = 5 new information once again causes an
instantaneous price adjustment to P = 106 (I);
– in “world I”, it takes a series of transactions to move the price from P = 100
to P = 104, i.e., from A to C. Since there are only rational traders in this
world, the price movement will stop at the new fundamental equilibrium level
and stay there until t = 3 (then the price starts to move from D to F, and later
from H to J);
– in “world II”, there exist traders who form their expectations according to
the most recent price movements, i.e., when prices move persistently up
(down) they expect the respective short-term trend to continue. Hence, they
buy (sell) when prices are rising (falling), causing the price to overshoot (from
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Table 1: Features of three hypothetical ‘worlds’ of financial markets
As a consequence of asset price “trending”, rational investors (in the sense of
profit-seeking) will try to systematically exploit this non-randomness in price
dynamics. The conditions of “world II” will therefore almost inevitably emanate
from those of “world I”: if prices move smoothly from one fundamental equilib-
rium to the next, and if this price discovery process takes some time, then profit-
seeking actors will develop trend-following trading strategies (for models dealing
with the interaction of heterogeneous actors see DeLong et al., 1990a and 1990b;
World 0 World I World II
General characteristic Perfect knowledge and 
foresight.
Rational expectations.
No transaction costs 
(frictionless markets).
As in world 0 with two 
exceptions:
– Transaction costs matter
– Expectations of other 
actors due to news have to 
be discovered in a gradual 
adjustment process.
Imperfect knowledge as gen-
eral condition of social inter-
action:
Actors process different 
information sets using differ-
ent models.
Actors are human beings:
Expectations and transac-
tions are governed by 
rational, emotional und 
social factors.
Expectations Homogeneous. In general homogeneous, 




Expectations formation Quantitative. Quantitative. Often only directional (quali-
tative).
Price adjustment to 
news
Instantaneous jumps to 
the new fundamental 
equilibrium.
Gradual price movement 
towards the new funda-
mental equilibrium.
Price movement overshoots 
the (‘region’ of) the new fun-
damental equilibrium.
Short-term trending of asset 
prices accumulates to 
medium-term trends due to 
optimistic or pessimistic 
biases in expectations (‘bull-
ishness/bearishness’).
Transaction volume Low (counterpart of the 
‘underlying’ trans-
action in goods mar-
kets).
‘Basic’ liquidity necessary 
for the price discovery 
process =>
Trading volume higher 
than the ‘underlying’ goods 
markets transactions, mov-
ing in tandem with the lat-
ter over time.
‘Excessive’ trading causes 
transaction volumes to grow 
significantly faster than the 
‘underlying’ transactions in 
goods markets.
Trading is based on  Fundamentals. Fundamentals. Fundamentals, technical 
models as well as on psycho-
logical factors on the individ-
ual level (e.g. emotions) as 
well as on the social level 
(e.g. market moods, herding).
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Frankel and Froot, 1990; De Grauwe and Grimaldi, 2006; Hommes, 2006; Fryd-
man and Goldberg, 2007).
Over more than 100 years people have developed and used a great variety of
“technical” trading systems. All models of “technical analysis” have in common
that they attempt to exploit price trends and by doing so they reinforce the pat-
tern of asset price dynamics as a sequence of upward and downward trends (for
a comprehensive treatment of technical analysis see Kaufman, 1987; the interac-
tion between technical trading and price dynamics is explored in Schulmeister,
2006, 2009b).
In our stylized example those transactions (in “world II”) which cause the price
to overshoot (driving it from C to K, from G to L and from M to O) have to be
considered “excessive” (as in “world I” price movements are triggered by news
also in “world II”). These overshooting price changes amount to 12 between t =
1 and t = 7. The overall price changes over this period amount to 30 (8 + 10 +
12), whereas only cumulative price changes of 10 (4 + 2 + 4) would be fundamen-
tally justified.
This stylized example shows that once prices start to overshoot, their overall price
path becomes much longer and the related transaction volumes get much bigger
than under purely rational expectations (as in “world I”). At the same time the
trending of asset prices provides opportunities for technical (i.e., non-fundamen-
tal) speculation, and the use of these speculation systems in turn strengthens asset
price trends.
5.3. PATTERN OF ASSET PRICE DYNAMICS
I shall now investigate how short-term runs of asset prices bring about long-term
overshooting. Hence, I address the relationship between the following two phe-
nomena:
– exchange rates but also stock prices and commodity prices move in a
sequence of upward trends (“bull markets”) and downward trends (“bear
markets”) which last for several years;
– trading volume in financial markets has expanded enormously, at present it
is almost 100 times higher than nominal GDP of OECD countries. This
expansion is mainly driven by the acceleration of trading: The time horizon
of most transactions is shorter than a few hours.
The coincidence of both developments constitutes a puzzle. How can very short-
term transactions generate asset price movements which accumulate to long-term
“bull markets” and “bear markets”? To put it differently: which properties of
asset price dynamics cause asset prices to move in long-term irregular cycles, i.e.,
in a sequence of upward and downward trends?
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To find preliminary answers to these questions, I investigate the movements of the
dollar/euro exchange rate with respect to the following hypothesis (a special case
of the more general “bull-bear-hypothesis”):
– over the short run, asset prices fluctuate almost always around “underlying”
trends. If one smoothes the respective price series with simple moving aver-
ages, one can easily identify the “underlying” trends;
– the phenomenon of “trending” repeats itself across different time scales. E.g.,
there occur trends based on 1-minute-data as well as trends based on daily
data. However, the volatility of fluctuations around the trend is higher the
higher is the data frequency;
– long-term upward or downward trends (“bulls and bears”) are the result of
the accumulation of price runs based on daily data which last for several years
longer in one direction than the counter-movements.
Figure 2: The movements of the dollar/euro exchange rate and technical trading 
signals 1999-2008
Source: Federal Reserve System, WIFO.
At first, I look at the “Gestalt” of exchange rate movements taking the dollar/euro
rate as example. The (irregular) cycle of the dollar/euro exchange rate between



















A                        B C                                       D
SUERF2010_3.book  Page 105  Thursday, June 17, 2010  12:09 PM106 THE QUEST FOR STABILITY: THE VIEW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
larcier
trend lasting from January 1999 to October 2000, and an upward trend lasting
from January 2002 to December 2004 (marked by A and C in figure)2.
Both long-term trends were realised in a sequence of shorter (medium-term)
trends. For example, the euro depreciation over period A was brought about in
three downward trends which were interrupted by only small counter-movements
(figure 2). In a similar manner the euro appreciation during period C was realised
in a sequence of several trends, each lasting some months. Figure 2 shows how an
extremely simple technical model would have exploited exchange rate trends:
Whenever the price crosses the 50-days moving average from below (above), a
buy (sell) signal is given (marked in some cases by L(ong) and S(hort) in figure 2).
Figure 3: Technical trading signals based on intraday dollar/euro exchange rates, 
June, 6-13, 2003 – 5-minute data
Source: Olsen Ltd., WIFO.
The pattern of exchange rate dynamics as a sequence of trends, interrupted by
counter-movements and – comparatively seldom – by non-directional movements
(“whipsaws”), seems to repeat itself across different time scales. Figure 3 displays
exchange rate movements based on five-minute data over six business days in
June 2003 (also the trading signals of a simple MA model are given).
As next step, I demonstrate how the accumulation of monotonic movements
(“runs”) of the daily exchange rate brings about exchange rate trends lasting
2 In the following, I present some results on a recent study (SCHULMEISTER 2009d) which covers the period 1999
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several years (as during period A and C). As table 2 shows, the euro depreciation
in period A was primarily due to downward runs lasting by one third longer than
upward runs (2.4 days versus 1.8 days), the average slope of upward and down-
ward runs was approximately the same.
This pattern is particularly pronounced on the basis of 5-days moving averages
of the original price series (table 2): The long-term appreciation (depreciation)
trend of the $/€ exchange rate in period A (C) is primarily brought about by
upward (downward) runs lasting longer than “counter-runs” – the differences in
the slopes of upward and downward runs play only a minor role3.
I will now document the distribution of the single upward and downward runs
according to their length for two periods, first, for the period of a long-term
depreciation trend of the euro (period A), and, second, for the period of an appre-
ciating euro (period B).
Over the depreciation phase A, short upward runs occurred more frequently than
short downward runs (93 runs compared to 69 runs; short runs are defined as
lasting up to 2 days). By contrast, within the set of medium runs (between 3 and
6 days) and long runs (longer than 6 days), downward runs occurred more fre-
quently than upward runs (table 3).
By the same token, short downward runs occurred more frequently than short
upward runs over the appreciation phase C, however, medium and long runs were
more often upward directed than downward directed (table 3).
Table 2: Runs of the $/€ exchange rate 1999/2006 – Daily data
Source: WIFO. – 1) Average change in exchange rate level per day in cents.
Note: Period A: 1/1/1999 bis 25/10/2005, period B: 26/10/2000 bis 31/1/ 2002,
Period C: 3/1/2002 bis 30/12/2004, period D: 31/12/2004 bis 14/11/2006.
3 This result was already obtained in a study which elaborated the pattern of exchange rate dynamics by meas-
uring the path of the daily deutschemark/dollar exchange rate between 1980 and 1986 (SCHULMEISTER 1987).
Also the “bull markets” (“bear markets”) of commodity futures are realized by upward (downward) runs
lasting longer than counter-movements (SCHULMEISTER 2009a).
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In order to test for the robustness of these results, I generate 1000 random series
(“random walks without drift”). I then compare the observed distribution of
monotonic price movements to the expected distribution under the random walk
hypothesis (RWH). This comparison shall reveal in which class of runs (by length)
and based on which smoothing parameter (length of moving average = MA) does
the observed number of runs deviate (most) significantly from the expected
number according to the RWH.
Table 3: Non-random components in the duration of exchange rate runs – Daily data
1) Before being classified, the observed exchange rate series as well as the 1000 random walk series are smoothed
by the respective moving average.
Notes: The table compares the observed numbers of exchange rate runs by duration to their expected means under
the random-walk-hypothesis (RWH). These means are derived from a Monte-Carlo-simulation based on 1000
random walk series (without drift). The random walks were constructed with an expected zero mean of the first
differences and with an expected standard deviation of the first differences as observed in the original exchange rate
series over the respective period. * (**, ***) indicate the significance of the difference between the observed means
and the expected means under the random-walk-hypothesis at the 10% (5%, 1%) level.
Based on the original data (MA = 1), there occurred significantly more short runs
than under the RWH over the appreciation period C (this holds to a larger extent
true for short downward runs as compared to short upward runs). At the same
time there occurred significantly less medium and long downward runs (table 3).
Over the depreciation period A, by contrast, there occurred significantly less
short downward runs, but significantly more medium downward runs, and less
medium and long upward runs than under the RWH (table 3).
Upward runs Downward runs Upward runs Downward runs
observed RWH observed RWH observed RWH observed RWH
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Table 4: Non-random components in the duration of exchange rate runs – 
30-Minutes data
1) Before being classified, the observed exchange rate series as well as the 1000 random walk series are smoothed
by the respective moving average.
Notes: The table compares the observed numbers of exchange rate runs by duration to their expected means under
the random-walk-hypothesis (RWH). These means are derived from a Monte-Carlo-simulation based on 1000
random walk series (without drift). The random walks were constructed with an expected zero mean of the first
differences and with an expected standard deviation of the first differences as observed in the original exchange rate
series over the respective period. * (**, ***) indicate the significance of the difference between the observed means
and the expected means under the random-walk-hypothesis at the 10% (5%, 1%).
Based on smoothed series (both, the observed exchange rate series as well as the
random series are smoothed by a 5 days and 20 days moving average), the most
significant deviations of the observed number of runs from their expected values
under the RWH concern the most persistent runs (lasting longer than 14 days in
the case of a 5 days MA, and longer than 34 days in the case of a 20 days MA –
table 3). Over the depreciation period A, e. g, there occurred many “abnormally”
long lasting monotonic downward movements (many more than upward move-
ments). In an analogous way, over the appreciation period C there occurred many
“abnormally” long lasting upward movements (many more than downward
movements).
Finally, I show the results of the same exercise based on 30 minutes data. The
frequency of these data is by a factor of 48 higher than the frequency of daily
data. Hence, the length of the moving averages is much longer than in the case of
daily data. The most important results for the original (unsmoothed) 30-minutes
exchange rates are as follows (table 4):
– short lasting exchange rate runs occurred significantly more frequently than
expected under the RWH, whereas persistent runs occurred less often than
under the RWH;
– the overall number of observed exchange rate runs is significantly higher than
is to be expected if 30 minutes exchange rates followed a random walk.
Upward runs Downward runs Upward runs Downward runs
observed RWH observed RWH observed RWH observed RWH
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When the 30-minutes data are smoothed by a 50 period MA and by a 100 period
MA, respectively, a very different picture emerges (table 4):
– over the depreciation period A, there occurred less short exchange rate runs
than under the RWH. At the same time, there occurred significantly more
long downward runs, but significantly less upward runs than under the
RWH;
– also over the appreciation period C, the number of short lasting runs is
smaller than expected under the RWH. Analogously to the depreciation
period A, there occurred significantly more long lasting upward runs than
under the RWH. At the same time there occurred less persistent downward
runs;
– the overall number of upward and downward runs is in all but one case
(period A/50 period MA) lower than expected under the RWH.
To conclude: The volatility of exchange rates based on intraday data, i.e., the
frequency of short lasting ups and downs, is even higher when measured on the
basis of intraday data than on daily data. In both cases the observed short-term
volatility is higher than in the case of a random walk. However, in both cases the
exchange rate fluctuates around an “underlying” trend. As a consequence, there
occur less short lasting runs and more long lasting (persistent) runs when the
exchange rate series is smoothed by moving averages. Persistent upward (down-
ward) runs last longer during an appreciation (depreciation) phase than the coun-
ter-movements. Hence, the sequence of these runs results in a stepwise apprecia-
tion (depreciation) process, i.e., in long-term exchange rate trends.
This pattern in the dynamics of speculative prices conflicts with the most funda-
mental assumption of the “efficient market hypothesis”. According to this con-
cept any asset price reflects the fundamental equilibrium value of the respective
asset. If new information arrives, actors will drive the price instantaneously to its
new equilibrium. This (rational) behaviour assures that asset prices follow a ran-
dom which in turn implies “weak market efficiency”. This concept means that
one cannot systematically make trading profits from exploiting just the informa-
tion contained in past prices (as do the popular trading rules of technical analy-
sis)4.
Since the most popular trading technique in financial markets, the so called “tech-
nical analysis”, is based on the (assumed) exploitability of asset price trends, I
shall finally sketch the interaction between this trading practice and asset price
dynamics.
4 Recent contributions to the debate about the efficiency of asset markets are LE ROY (1989), SHILLER (2003),
LO (2004).
SUERF2010_3.book  Page 110  Thursday, June 17, 2010  12:09 PMASSET PRICE FLUCTUATIONS, FINANCIAL CRISES AND STABILIZING EFFECTS 111
larcier
Figure 4: Technical trading signals for the S&P500 futures contract, 
July and August, 2000
Source: Futures Industry Instittute (Washington D.C.), WIFO.
5.4. TECHNICAL TRADING AND THE TRENDING OF ASSET 
PRICES
Technical analysis tries to exploit price trends which “technicians” consider the
most typical feature of asset price dynamics (“the trend is your friend”). Hence,
these trading techniques derive buy and sell signals from the most recent price
movements which (purportedly) indicate the continuation of a trend or its
reversal (trend-following or contrarian models)5. Since technical analysts believe
that the pattern of asset price dynamics as a sequence of trends interrupted by
“whipsaws” repeats itself across different time scales, they apply technical models
to price data of almost any frequency, ranging from daily data to tick data.
According to the timing of trading signals, one can distinguish between trend-
following strategies and contrarian models. Trend-following systems produce
buy (sell) signals in the early stage of an upward (downward) trend, whereas
contrarian strategies produce sell (buy) signals at the end of an upward (down-
ward) trend, e.g., contrarian models try to identify “overbought” (“oversold”)
situations.
5 KAUFMAN (1987) provides an excellent treatment of the different methods of technical analysis. For a short
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Technical analysis is omnipresent in financial markets. In the foreign exchange
market, e.g., technical analysis is the most widely used trading technique (for
recent survey studies see CHEUNG et al., 2004; GEHRIG and MENKHOFF, 2006;
MENKHOFF and TAYLOR, 2007). It seems highly plausible that technical analysis
plays a similar role in stock (index futures) markets as well as in commodity
futures markets (IRWIN and HOLT, 2004, provide evidence about the popularity
of technical analysis in futures markets).
Figure 5: Technical trading signals for WTI crude oil futures contract 2007-2008
Source: NYMEX, WIFO.
Many factors have contributed to the popularity of technical trading systems
among practitioners. First, these systems can be “universally” used, i.e., they can
be applied to any kind of price data frequency. Second, these price data have
become easily available (at ever falling costs). Third, computer software has been
continuously improved (and got cheaper at the same time). Fourth, the internet
has enabled traders (professionals as well as amateurs) to trade in real time on all
important market places in the world.
Figures 2, 3, 4, 5 show how simple MA models based on different data frequen-
cies operate in the dollar/euro market, the stock index futures market and the oil
futures market (if a model uses two moving averages, then their crossing indicates
a trading signal). There is one universal property of the performance of technical
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often single losses than single profits, however, profitable positions last on aver-
age three to four times longer than unprofitable positions which causes the mod-
els to (often) produce an overall profit. This profitability pattern reflects the fact
that technical trading systems focus on the exploitation of price trends (for a
detailed analysis of profitability of technical models in different asset markets see
Schulmeister, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2009c, 2009d).
Figure 6: Aggregate trading signals of 1092 technical models and the dynamics of oil 
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There operates an interaction between the “trending” of asset prices and the use
of technical models in practice. On the one hand, many different models are used
by individual traders aiming at a profitable exploitation of asset price trends, on
the other hand the aggregate behaviour of all models strengthen and lengthen
price trends. Figure 6 documents this interaction, it compares the change in the
aggregate position of 1092 technical models in the oil futures market to the move-
ments of the oil futures price (a value of +100 (-100) of the net position index
means that 100% of the models hold a long (short) position).
Figure 6 shows the gradual adjustment of the 1092 technical models to oil futures
price movements between January 2007 and June 2008. On February 7, 2008,
e.g., all models hold a short position due to a preceding decline in oil futures
prices. The subsequent price rise causes the models to gradually switch their posi-
tion from short to long, the “fast” models at first, the “slow” models at last. On
February 21, all models hold a long position. During this transition period from
short to long, technical models exert an excess demand on oil futures since any
switch implies two buy transactions, one to close the (former) short position, and
one to open the (new) long position.
Studies on the aggregate trading behaviour of the many different models, based
on daily as well as on intraday data and operating in different markets reveals the
following (Schulmeister, 2006, 2009a, 2009c, 2009d). First, most of the time the
great majority of the models is on the same side of the market. Second, the process
of changing open positions usually takes off 1 to 3 days (or 30-minute intervals)
after the local futures price minimum (maximum) has been reached. Third, it
takes between 10 and 20 trading  days (or 30-minute intervals) to gradually
reverse the positions of (almost) all models if a persistent price trend develops.
Fourth, after all technical models have adjusted their open positions to the cur-
rent trend, the trend often continues for some time.
One can therefore conclude that the widespread use of technical trading systems
strengthens and lengthens short-term asset price trends (runs). At the same time,
the sequence of price runs accumulates to long-term trends when an expectational
bias (“bullishness” or “bearishness”) prevails in the market. Hence, the technical
trading together with the frequent predominance of a “market mood” can be
considered the most important causes of the overshooting of asset prices. I shall
present some empirical evidence on this phenomenon.
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Figure 7: Dollar/euro exchange rate and purchasing power parity
Source: OECD, WIFO, Schulmeister (2005).
5.5. OVERSHOOTING OF ASSET PRICES
Figure 7 shows the wide fluctuations of the US-dollar/Euro(ECU) exchange rate
around its theoretical equilibrium level, i.e., the purchasing power parity (PPP) of
internationally traded goods and services (for the calculation of PPP based on
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Figure 8: Dollar exchange rate and oil price fluctuations
Source: OECD, IMF. - 1) Vis-à-vis DM, Franc, Pound, Yen.
Figure 8 displays the sequence of booms and busts of the US dollar exchange rate
and of the crude oil price since the late 1960s. Even though one can hardly quan-
tify the fundamental equilibrium price of crude oil, it seems implausible that the
latter fluctuates as widely as the market price (figure 8). It is much more plausible
that oil price overshooting is the result of the interaction between news-based
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Figure 9: World market for crude oil, oil futures trading and oil price movements
Source: Energy Information Agency (EIA), OECD, New York Mercantile
Exchange (NYMEX), Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), WIFO.
This presumption is confirmed by the development of supply and demand in the
market for physical oil as well as by the expansion of trading activities in the oil
derivatives markets (figure 9). During the oil price boom between 2002 and 2008,
oil production rose slightly stronger than demand, causing inventories to rise. The
demand for oil of China – often quoted as the most important single cause for the
oil price boom – can hardly explain the extent of the oil price increase. Net oil
imports of China account for only 9% of global demand (China still produces
roughly half of its oil consumption). Moreover, China’s net oil imports have
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The tremendous increase in trading activities in oil futures markets since 2003
suggests that (technical) speculation might have contributed significantly to the
oil price boom (figure 9). This presumption gets support from the fact that also
the boom of other commodity prices coincided with a spectacular rise in trading
of commodity derivatives in general, in particular since 2006 (figure 10).
Figure 10: Dynamics of commodity futures prices and derivatives trading activities, 
2007-2008
Source: New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), Chicago Board of
Trade (CBOT), BIS, WIFO.
Figure 9 also suggests that the overshooting of the dollar exchange rate and the
overshooting of the oil price are inversely related to each other, at least during
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global key currency, crude oil is priced in dollars (like all other commodities). As
a consequence, any dollar depreciation devalues real oil export earnings. This
valuation effect in turn strengthens the incentive for oil-producing countries to
increase the price of their most important export good. If their market power is
strong, oil exporters are able to put through oil price increases which by far over-
compensates them for the losses due to the preceding dollar depreciation. The oil
price “shocks” 1973/74, 1978/80 and 2002/2007 are the most impressing exam-
ples for the inverse relationship between dollar depreciations and subsequent oil
price movements (see also Schulmeister, 2000).
Figure 11: Stock market value and net worth of non-financial corporations
Source: Fed, Deutsche Bundesbank, Schulmeister (2003).
Figure 11 shows that stock prices in the US and Germany became progressively
undervalued over the 1960s and 1970s: The stock market value of non-financial
corporations strongly declined relative to their net worth (real assets at goods
market prices minus net financial liabilities6. This development can be explained
by the fact that during this the striving for profits focused on the real side of the
economy. As a consequence, real capital accumulation was booming und stock
prices rose comparatively little (partly because corporate business financed
investments through increasing the supply of stocks).
The stock market boom of the 1980s and 1990s and the slow-down in real invest-
ment dynamics caused stock prices to become progressively overvalued. By the end
of the 1990s the stock market value of corporate business in the US as well as in
6 The relation depicted in figure 11 is an estimate of Tobin’s q. For the data series and the method to calculate
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Germany was roughly 80% higher than its net worth. This discrepancy was the most
important cause of the “tilt” from a “bull market” into a “bear market” in 2000.
Between spring 2003 and summer 2007 stock prices were again booming, in Ger-
many even stronger than in the US. At the same time real investment expanded in
the US much stronger than in Germany. Hence, the discrepancy between the stock
market value of non-financial corporate business and its net worth rose much
stronger in Germany than in the US (figure 11). Unsurprisingly, since summer
2007 stock prices have fallen much stronger in Germany as compared to the US.
Figure 12: Stock price fluctuations in Germany, the United Kingdom and the US
Source: Yahoo Finance (http://de.finance.yahoo.com/m8).
Figure 12 shows the two “bull markets” and two “bear markets” which devel-
oped since the mid 1990s. The amplitude of the irregular cycles is much higher in
the case of Germany as compared to the traditional market places in the US and
the UK. Also this observation confirms the presumption of a systematic over-
shooting of asset prices: The real economy in Germany fluctuated less than in the
US or the UK (the German economy was stagnating most of the time since the
mid 1990s), and also the recovery between 2003 and 2007 was much weaker in
Germany than in the US or the UK.
Equilibrium economics under rational expectations cannot account for wide fluc-
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conventional theory can only explain two types of equilibrium paths, either con-
vergence towards the fundamental equilibrium or a bubble. Hence, exactly that
phenomenon, which can most easily be observed in real life and which practition-
ers call sequences of “bulls” and “bears”, remains unexplained in mainstream
economics.
Empirical exchange rate studies, e.g., conceive the “purchasing power parity puz-
zle” primarily as the (unexplained) low speed at which an over- or undervalued
exchange rate returns to its fundamental equilibrium. The preceding process of
“overshooting” is simply attributed to “shocks” and, remains unexplained
(Rogoff, 1995; Sarno and Taylor, 2002; Taylor and Taylor, 2004). This kind of
perception prevents conventional economists from looking at the interdepend-
ency between upward trends and downward trends in asset price dynamics.
Empirical stock market studies focus in most cases on specific “anomalies” like
the “momentum effect” (caused by the “trending” of stock prices) or the
“reversal effect” (caused by trend reversals). However, these phenomena are not
analyzed in the context of the irregular cyclicality of asset prices (for surveys of
empirical stock market studies see Campbell, 2000; Cochrane 1999; Lo and
MacKinlay, 1999; Shiller, 1999). An important reason for this “myopic” percep-
tion lies in the fact that the relatively new and popular school of “behavioural
finance” uses equilibrium concepts as the reference or benchmark models, too. As
a consequence, observations which contradict equilibrium models can only be
perceived as “anomalies”7.
5.6. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CURRENT CRISIS
The sequence of “bull markets” and “bear markets”, and, hence, the overshoot-
ing of exchange rates, commodity prices and stock prices, affects the real sphere
of the economy through many channels, e.g., by increasing uncertainty, by pro-
ducing waves of positive and negative wealth effects (strengthened by the rising
importance of pension and college funds), by inflating and deflating the balance
sheets of financial institutions and by redistributing trade earnings between con-
sumers and producers of commodities:
– the boom of stock prices in the 1990s and again between 2003 and 2007 as
well as the boom of house prices between 1998 and 2005 stimulated the US
economy through positive wealth effects (figure 13). At the same time, how-
ever, the “twin booms” led the ground for the subsequent “twin busts”. The
7 SCHULMEISTER (1987) and FRYDMAN and GOLDBERG (2007) offer models which explain asset price dynamics
as a sequence of systematically overshooting upward and downward trends (“bulls” and “bears”). For the
“long swings” of the dollar exchange rate see ENGEL and HAMILTON (1990).
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related devaluation of financial as well as housing wealth will depress con-
sumption and investment for years (figure 13);
– after the outbreak of the sub-prime mortgage crisis the third “bull market”,
i.e., the commodity price boom, accelerated, mainly driven by speculation of
financial investors in commodity derivatives markets (figures 5, 6 and 10).
This development further deteriorated global economic prospects;
– since mid 2008 the devaluation process of stock wealth, housing wealth and
commodity wealth is globally “synchronized” (as was the preceding “triple
booms”). This – in part still ongoing – process sets free several contraction
forces, not only through wealth effects and balance sheet compression but
also via import reductions on behalf of commodity producers (commodity
prices fell by roughly 60% within 4 months – figure 10);
– the fall of stock prices and commodity prices has been strengthened by trend-
following technical trading via taking huge short positions in the respective
derivatives markets. Due to the extraordinary strength of these “bear mar-
kets”, hedge funds using these models (in many cases “automated trading
systems”) reported higher returns than ever before (figure 16).
Figure 13: Wealth of private household in the US
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The “epicentre” of the “financial tsunami” is the threefold wealth devaluation
process (the last time when stock wealth, housing wealth and commodity wealth
collapsed simultaneously was between 1929 and 1933). The extent of this deval-
uation process was made possible through the preceding overvaluation through
the simultaneous boom of stock prices, house prices and commodity prices. The
three “bull markets” and the three “bear markets”, are the result of “business as
usual” in modern financial markets (I do not need exceptionally greedy bankers
etc. to explain how the potential for the crisis was built up).
Many feed-back processes strengthened the process of wealth devaluation (e.g.,
the fall in house prices caused more and more homeowners to default on their
mortgage, the subsequent foreclosures depressed house prices further). One feed-
back process is most typical for modern “finance capitalism” (figure 14): Trend-
following hedge funds opened huge short positions in the markets for stock and
commodity derivatives in reaction to the price decline in these markets (in partic-
ular after the default of Lehman Brothers). This “bear speculation” became
extremely profitable for these hedge funds due to the steepness of the asset price
fall. At the same time, this strategy strengthened the asset price decline and,
hence, the devaluation of the savings of 100 million people all over the world.
Figure 14: Profitability of trend-following hedge funds
Source: www.turtletrader.com 1) Unweighted average of the returns net of fees and
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The transformation of financial markets and institutions from a sector servicing
the “real economy” to an (dominant) sector to which the “real economy” has to
adjust, can only be understood in the context of the latest “long cycle” (Schul-
meister, 1998).
The trough of this cycle was the Great Depression of the 1930s. The learning
process enforced by this crisis resulted in a new macro-economic theory (Keyne-
sianism), an active economic policy focusing on stable growth and full employ-
ment, a stable international monetary system (“Bretton Woods”), de-regulation
of goods markets (e.g. though the GATT rounds), but strict regulation of financial
markets. The essential characteristic of the system was the following: The driving
force of capitalist development, the striving for profits, was systematically
directed towards activities in the “real economy” (hence, I termed this regime
“real capitalism” – Schulmeister, 2004). Under these conditions the “Golden
Age” of capitalism was realized over the 1950s and 1960s.
The “monetarist counterrevolution” of the late 1960s got support from “big
business” because permanent full employment had strengthened trade unions as
well as the welfare state. The stepwise realization of the monetarist/neo-liberal
demand for de-regulation of financial markets changed the “rule of the capitalis-
tic game” fundamentally. Under the condition of widely fluctuating exchange
rates and commodity prices, and of a high interest-growth-differential (until the
late 1970s interest rates had been kept lower than the rate of economic growth),
financial and non-financial business shifted activities from the “real economy” to
financial investment and short-term speculation (“finance capitalism”). This shift
was supported by the tremendous amount of financial innovations (i.e., deriva-
tives of all kinds) which have been realized since the 1980s as well as by the rising
instability of asset prices. Both factors provided more and more chances for mak-
ing huge speculative profits from short-term trading.
The expansion of financial transactions is therefore one of the most typical char-
acteristics of the late phase in a “finance-capitalistic” development (together with
the rising instability of those asset prices which are most important for the “real
economy” like exchange rates, commodity prices and stock prices).
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Figure 15: Overall financial transactions in the world economy
Source: Bank for International Settlements (BIS), World Federation of Exchanges (WFE),
WIFO.
5.7. DYNAMICS OF FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS
Trading activities in financial markets have exploded over the past 20 years8:
– there is a remarkable discrepancy between the levels of financial transactions
and the levels of transactions in the “real world”. In 2007, the former was
roughly 74 times higher than nominal world GDP. This discrepancy has risen
tremendously since the late 1990s (figure 15);
– trading in derivatives markets has expanded significantly stronger than trad-
ing in spot markets, this holds true for any kind of asset/instrument. In the
world economy, derivatives trading volume is roughly 66 times higher than
world GDP, whereas spot trading amounts to “only” 8 times world GDP
(figure 15);
– trading of futures and options on organized exchanges (which is open to the
general public) has risen stronger than “over-the-counter”-transactions
(which are restricted to professionals), in particular since 2000 (figure 16);
8 A comprehensive estimate of financial transaction in the global economy, differentiated by types of instruments
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– these developments are particularly pronounced in Europe where the volume
of financial transactions was more than 100 times higher than nominal GDP;
– given the spectacular level of derivatives trading only a comparatively small
share of transactions stem from hedging activities. The greatest part of trans-
actions is related to speculative trades between actors with heterogeneous
price expectations.
Figure 16: Financial transactions in the world economy by instruments
Source: Bank for International Investments (BIS), World Federation of Exchanges (WFE),
5.8. STABILIZING EFFECTS AND REVENUE POTENTIAL OF A 
GENERAL FINANCIAL TRANSACTION TAX
A small financial transaction tax (hereafter FTT) would dampen the fluctuations
of exchange rates, stock prices and commodity prices over the short run as well
as over the long run. At the same time, such a tax would yield substantial reve-
nues.
A general FTT would specifically dampen very short-term oriented and destabi-
lizing trading in derivatives markets. There are two reasons for that. First, a FTT
makes trading the more costly the shorter its time horizon is (e.g., technical trad-
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trading since the tax rate refers to contract value (e.g., the effective tax on the
margin “invested” is by the leverage factor higher than the tax relative to the
value of the transaction).
Derivatives transactions for hedging purposes as well as “real-world-transac-
tions” (spot) would hardly be affected by a low FTT between 0.1% and 0.01%.
Assuming that trading declines due to the introduction of a FTT of 0.01% (1
basis point) by roughly 30%, overall tax revenues would amount to 0.529% of
world GDP or 287.3 bill. $ (based on 2007 data – table 5). More than half of the
revenues (164.4 bill. $) would stem from derivatives transactions on exchanges
(these transactions could be taxed most easily due to the use of electronic settle-
ment systems). Taxes on spot transactions would amount to only 11.6 bill. $.
In Europe (EU27 plus Norway and Switzerland) a FTT at the (low) rate of 0.01%
would yield roughly 130 bill. $ or 0.734% of nominal GDP (table 1).
Table 5: Hypothetical transaction tax receipts in the global economy 2007
The introduction of a general FTT could help to overcome the current economic
crisis and to prevent similar crises in the future. This is so for several reasons.
First, such a tax addresses one of the most important factors of building up the
potential for the ongoing devaluation of financial and commodity wealth, i.e., the
“manic-depressive” fluctuations of stock prices, exchange rates and commodity
prices. Second, a low FTT of 0.01% would specifically dampen short-term and
destabilizing transactions in derivatives markets. Third, the revenues of a FTT are
substantial (even at a rate of only 0.01%), and this would help governments to
consolidate their fiscal stance.
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SUERF – SOCIÉTÉ UNIVERSITAIRE EUROPÉENNE DE 
RECHERCHES FINANCIÈRES
SUERF is incorporated in France as a non-profit-making Association. It was
founded in 1963 as a European-wide forum with the aim of bringing together
professionals from both the practitioner and academic sides of finance who have
an interest in the working of financial markets, institutions and systems, and the
conduct of monetary and regulatory policy. SUERF is a network association of
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SUERF has its full-time permanent Executive Office and Secretariat located at
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sonal and academic institution membership fees. Corporate membership cur-
rently includes major European financial institutions and Central Banks. SUERF
is strongly supported by Central Banks in Europe and its membership comprises
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DE NEDERLANDSCHE BANK (DNB)
De Nederlandsche Bank, or DNB, champions financial stability and makes an
active contribution to prosperity in the Netherlands.
To this end, DNB:
• cooperates with other national central banks within the Eurosystem to
maintain price stability;
• aims for smooth, reliable and efficient settlement of payments;
• ensures that financial institutions have adequate financial buffers to meet
their liabilities as well as sound corporate governance;
• contributes to good national and international decision-making in these
areas by providing economic advice.
Authoritative knowledge and statistics are essential for the proper discharge of its
responsibilities. DNB strives to fully integrate and anchor sustainability in its
business operations and the performance of its tasks. As a knowledge institution,
DNB is committed to sharing its knowledge with society and strives to operate
effectively and efficiently.
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RABOBANK
Rabobank Group is an international financial services provider operating on the
basis of cooperative principles. It offers retail banking, wholesale banking, asset
management, leasing and real estate services. Focus is on all-finance services in
the Netherlands and on food & agri internationally. Rabobank Group is com-
prised of 152 independent local Rabobanks plus Rabobank Nederland, their cen-
tral organisation, and a number of subsidiaries. The group entities maintain
strong mutual ties. Overall, Rabobank Group has upwards of 60,000 employees
(in FTEs), who serve about 9.5 million clients in 46 countries.
During the current crisis Rabobank has been the only large bank in the Nether-
lands to operate without government support. It has managed to remain profita-
ble in both 2008 and 2009. In terms of Tier I capital Rabobank Group is among
the world’s 25 largest financial institutions, with a Tier 1 ratio of 13.8% (2009).
Rabobank Group has the highest credit rating (triple A), awarded by well-known
international rating agencies such as Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investor
Service and Dominion Bond Rating Service. The origins of Rabobank lie in the
local loan cooperatives that were founded in the Netherlands nearly 110 years
ago by enterprising people who had virtually no access to the capital market.
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